Latin America: anti-poverty schemes instead of social protection by Lavinas, Lena
desiguALdades.net
Research Network on Interdependent
Inequalities in Latin America
Working Paper Series
Working Paper No. 51, 2013
Latin America
Anti-Poverty Schemes 
Instead of Social Protection 
Lena Lavinas
desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series
Published by desiguALdades.net International Research Network on Interdependent Inequalities in 
Latin America 
The desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series serves to disseminate first results of ongoing research 
projects in order to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the 
desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series does not constitute publication and should not limit 
publication in any other venue. Copyright remains with the authors. 
Copyright for this edition: Lena Lavinas
Editing and Production: Barbara Göbel / Barbara Fritz / Laura Kemmer / Cristina Samper / Paul Talcott 
All working papers are available free of charge on our website www.desiguALdades.net. 
Lavinas, Lena 2013: “Latin America: Anti-Poverty Schemes Instead of Social Protection”, 
desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series 51, Berlin: desiguALdades.net International Research 
Network on Interdependent Inequalities in Latin America.
The paper was produced by Lena Lavinas during her fellowship at desiguALdades.net from 08/2012 
- 01/2013.
desiguALdades.net International Research Network on Interdependent Inequalities in Latin America 
cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained 
in this Working Paper; the views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author or authors and 
do not necessarily reflect those of desiguALdades.net.
Latin America
Anti-Poverty Schemes Instead of Social Protection
Lena Lavinas1 
Abstract
This paper examines the extent to which poverty reduction schemes and targeting 
replaced the incomplete framework of social protection and universality in Latin 
America over the last decade, through the provision of monetary cash transfers rather 
than decommodified goods and services. Is this a turning point towards a new pattern 
of social policy in the region, characterized by basic standards, controls and selectivity 
for those who cannot afford market provision? What are the outcomes of such a 
turnaround with regard to poverty and inequality? Are there setbacks in the reduction 
of inequality, notably in terms of failing to overcome patterns of segregation and the 
social stigma of poverty?  Will these new trends reinforce the case for reforming 
social protection pillars for the non-poor? Will the discourse of privatization gain a new 
momentum and reverse the counter-reforms in favor of integrated public systems? 
The first section of this paper provides the conceptual background to understand why 
social protection systems and poverty reduction strategies differ, highlighting the role 
of the various components of social protection and their arguments in economic terms 
and for purposes of equity and social justice. Likewise, two distinct paradigms will be 
confronted: on the one hand, the social risk management strategy (Holzmann and 
Jørgensen 2000), and, on the other, universal social protection systems as they were 
gradually fashioned during the golden years of the 20th century in Western countries. 
The second section scrutinizes the profile of the public provision of welfare in some 
Latin American countries, through an overview of social spending, presenting the main 
features of conditional cash transfer programs in Latin America and other contributory 
schemes that have been reshaped as of late. The last section draws lessons from the 
experiment of the Bolsa Família Program in Brazil to discuss the effectiveness and 
the limits of conditional cash transfers on poverty reduction and inequality. Finally, the 
concluding section calls attention to the risks of developing social protection schemes 
mainly on the grounds of the provision of cash benefits – a pro-market strategy – if the
goal is to tackle poverty and inequality in the long run, promoting social cohesion such 
an uneven region.  
1 This paper enjoyed critical comments, formulated by Veronica Schild and Robert Boyer, during my 
stay at desiguALdades.net as a Fellow in the fall of 2012, as well as insights drawn from the regular 
colloquium meetings. I thank all Fellows and Principal Investigators, especially Sérgio Costa, and 
Barbara Fritz for her detailed comments, Paul Talcott and Flora Thomson-DeVeaux for being so 
supportive in the editing, and Tatiana Ferro, undergraduate student at the Institute of Economics at 
UFRJ for preparing the figures. Finally, I am also grateful to Francisca Talledo and Ana Fonseca who 
provided updated information on the Juntos and Mi Familia Progresa programs.  
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1. From Selectivity to Universality: Back and Forth 
If public goods – public services, public spaces, public facilities – are devalued, 
diminished in the eyes of citizens and replaced by private services available 
against cash, then we lose the sense that common interests and common 
needs ought to trump private preferences and individual advantage. And once 
we cease to value the public over the private, surely we shall come in time 
to have difficulty seeing just why we should value law (the public good par 
excellence) over force (Judt 2010: 129).
1.1. Overview: Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America
Conditional cash transfers targeted to the needy have become widespread in Latin 
America since the early 2000s. In many cases, they are seen as the main mechanism 
that contributed to reductions in poverty and extreme poverty, whose rates have fallen 
sharply as of the late (ECLAC 2012). These schemes are relatively low cost and 
eventually benefited from a period of economic recovery in the region (ECLAC 2012). 
This new macroeconomic context coupled with the consolidation of democracy is likely 
to have given national states the resources to adopt or expand safety nets. Conversely, 
the establishment of comprehensive social protection systems is likely to face higher 
hurdles. Universalism is at stake, challenged by the social risk management strategy, 
lately updated by the social protection floor proposal (ILO 2011). This paradigm would 
fit the developing world, and Latin American countries in particular, where some basic 
standards are already in place for the most vulnerable. The following sections center 
these newer programs and their implications in the context of the logics of welfare state 
programs in market societies. 
1.2.  From Poverty Reduction towards Equity in Market Societies
In the aftermath of World War II, the quest for universality was not only an ideological 
issue but a sensible approach to resetting effective economic policies to recover from 
devastation and help capitalism to pick itself up again. In this respect, the Keynesian 
Consensus (Judt 2010) played a crucial role for making the case that uncertainty 
and unpredictability in people´s lives under market rules require a different format 
for policies in general, and a more active and permanent role for the state. Contrary 
to the “embracing inequality” theories (Thompson 2012) that were hostile to state 
intervention in the economy, backing individualistic capitalism, Keynesianism favored 
a more disciplined relationship between market and state, and also grounded the case 
for welfare states (Townsend 2002). 
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The regulatory socioeconomic model that prevailed until the mid-1970s in Western 
advanced countries – and as partly embodied in the developmentalist framework 
(Bielschowsky 2006) in Latin America – put the State at center stage as the most 
prominent agent in charge of building up a national collective project committed to 
addressing two main issues to preserve freedom and democracy in a context of social 
political peace: renewed prosperity coupled with enhanced security. One may note 
that in Latin America, the shortage of the security leg of this framework was surpassed 
by the faith that soaring economic growth through a genuine and nationally-rooted 
industrialization process would automatically improve well-being and curtail high 
levels of social and economic inequality. The social dimension of development was not 
recognized within the state-led import substitution strategy that boosted the first wave 
of industrialization in the region. Instead, well-being was an expected output to be 
derived from increases in per capita GDP. The 1990s brought a different understanding 
about how essential equity issues were to consolidate economic growth. The second 
phase of developmentalism or the neo-structuralist wave from the 1990s onwards 
correctly added social policy into the Latin American progressive agenda.
Already in 1950, learning from the successful British experiment designed by 
William Beveridge and John Maynard Keynes (Harris 1997), with Nicholas Kaldor´s 
eminent and crucial support,2 the International Labor Organization (ILO) – echoing 
the understanding in the international community – held that comprehensive social 
protection systems are essential to achieve such aims and should be pursued by nation 
states. This implied going beyond simple poverty alleviation schemes (social minimums 
for subsistence levels, inherited from the 17th century British Poor Laws) towards a 
new policy approach in order to promote socioeconomic stability in a market-oriented 
world whose dynamics are fundamentally destabilizing and permeated by frequent 
crises and shortfalls. This was a decisive turning point with regard to the understanding 
of the aims of social protection. Beyond certain risks previously addressed by social 
insurance schemes, the social protection regime was to become a means to prevent 
and cope with uncertainty. Its scope then had to change accordingly. 
The new framework as envisioned by the ILO (1950) was conceived to cover a wider 
range of contingencies (not only destitution as under the late 17th century Poor Laws); 
provide benefits more nearly adequate to needs (instead of just basic or a limited 
backbone structure of benefits); break the tie between contribution payments and benefit 
rights, and therefore consolidating wage relations and going beyond the Bismarckian 
contributive model that perpetrated unequal access to benefits; and finally, to unify the 
2 Already in 1944, Kaldor participated in the design of fiscal policies aimed at guaranteeing full 
employment and financing the new social protection system (Dostaler 2012: 248).
      desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series No. 51, 2013 | 3
finance and administration of previously separated branches to allow individuals as 
citizens to switch categories rather than be bound within one system simply as workers. 
Such an understanding of how economic development and social protection were 
intertwined and should be articulated in the policymaking process gave rise to one of 
the most astonishing institutional innovations of the 20th century: the welfare state, or 
more properly, various welfare states. As Nicholas Barr puts it, “the roots of the welfare 
state are long-standing and complex. … Thus the sequence and timing of the different 
parts of the welfare state varied considerably across countries in the light of different 
attitudes and path dependency” (Barr 2012: 18). 
However the specific features varied to some extent from country to country, some 
common features remain relevant to all of them. Briggs´ accurate definition of the 
welfare state summarizes its essence: 
[A] state in which organized power is deliberately used (through politics and 
administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least 
three directions: by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum income 
irrespective of the market value of their work or their property; by narrowing the 
extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet certain ´social 
contingencies`; and by ensuring that all citizens without distinction of status or 
class are offered the best standards available in relation to a certain agreed 
range of social services. (Briggs 1961: 228)
Equality of status (which to Thomas H. Marshall is more important than equality of 
income; Marshall 1961) is not a minor aspect in reframing social protection since it 
should ensure equality of access and treatment, leading, in turn, to a continuous push 
for raising standards of services in order to meet the goal of equal citizenship over 
time. Combining rising standards with full coverage (since all are equal, nobody should 
be excluded and needs cannot be ranked according to importance) would bring about 
a virtuous economic cycle and address Keynes´s deepest concern about permanently 
maintaining the economy in conditions of quasi-boom in order to make it produce at 
its full potential (Carvalho 2006). This would preserve and stimulate full employment 
– the major source of well-being in market societies. The immediate effect would be 
to prevent crises, recessions, and depression, therefore avoiding loss and suffering 
due to economic volatility. Although occupational welfare (Titmuss 1968) would offset 
temporary hazards, it would not suffice in itself to maintain demand in “conditions of 
quasi-boom.” This accounts for the quest of universalizing rights beyond entitlements 
derived from an occupational status. 
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For Fernando C. Carvalho, if this assumption holds, “enlightened economic policy itself 
would work as social reform” (Carvalho 2006: 6), entailing, one may add, redistribution 
on a regular basis. Keynes´s conceptual approach connecting macroeconomics and 
social policies implies redistribution through universal provision, embracing scale and 
scope, on a continuous pace. In this respect, Beveridge´s most prominent contribution 
lies in casting “a plan all-embracing in scope of persons and needs” (Beveridge 1942). 
The outcomes of such a turn are broadly known and undisputable: more than three 
decades of intensive growth and innovation, rising productivity, reinforcing democracy, 
curbing inequality and lifting tens of millions of people out of poverty in Western 
developed countries. In 1970, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD 2013) reported a Gini Index for its country members of 0.378 for 
gross income, dropping to 0.316 when measured by disposable income (post-tax and 
post-monetary transfers). Although a huge increase in inequality was reported in 2000, 
with the Gini Index (for gross income) reaching 0.486, the architecture of the welfare 
states in most OECD countries still assured a relevant improvement of the Gini Index 
(income net of taxes and fiscal transfers): it went down to 0.406. Furthermore, this 
“indefinable and ubiquitous sense of security” (Judt 2010: 84) entailed social peace in 
the long run.  
Despite various formats ranging from residual schemes to more comprehensive and 
reflexive social protection systems, the welfare state can be then interpreted as a set 
of institutions, grounded on regulations and norms, whose primary aim, if they are to 
promote socioeconomic stability and attenuate crisis, is to provide mechanisms of risk 
sharing, which means assembling a larger number on principles of a solidary pooling. 
And the best way to achieve such a goal appears to be strengthening universalism. 
Deprivation of universal rights would affect the dynamics of capitalist accumulation, 
increasing inefficiency by reducing the economic potential of production, with negative 
impacts on well-being. It is not a coincidence that different sorts of universal schemes 
diffused rapidly in Western economies in line with the consolidation of welfare states. 
Little by little, the previous “social service state” in which limited services were provided 
for a limited group of the population (the targeted group, namely the poor) gave way to 
a more complex set of activities run by the state in order to provide security, entailing 
growing public spending. Such a dynamic reconfigures the welfare state, particularly 
the contributory regimes associated with the Bismarckian model. Two major shifts alter 
the previous welfare configuration and announce a new paradigm: (1) social policies 
were to prevent risks and the effects of negative contingencies that could occur or not, 
instead of just providing ex-post compensation; (2) and to be more effective, welfare 
policies were to be provided irrespective of status, income level or contributions. 
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Child benefits and basic pensions illustrate this turning point in terms of providing 
socioeconomic security beyond stratified and exclusionary contexts.
However, there are other justifications on the grounds of efficiency to support the 
existence of universal provision by the welfare state: to avoid asymmetric information 
and the harsh consequences of deficits in information-processing, which has negative 
impacts on society (demand and supply side), especially on the most vulnerable; to 
avoid power asymmetries; to face uncertainty (uninsurable) and not only risks (insurable) 
over the long run; to avoid mistakes in trying to measure well-being, earnings, and 
targeting; finally, to avoid discrimination, which aggravates inefficiencies and promotes 
unequal status (Barr 2012). 
For these very reasons, the design of the welfare state usually includes not only 
monetary benefits3 but also benefits in kind. The latter has enlarged in scope so as 
to supply capitalism with the increased security necessitated by its own deployment. 
Cash benefits address inefficiencies derived from market failures4 and problems of 
consumption smoothing over the life cycle, whereas benefits in kind (health, education, 
care in general) constitute a powerful mechanism in favor of universalism, for they 
promote equality of status on the basis of citizenship as well as equality of opportunities 
through a common set of services, provided irrespective of one´s income or lack of 
income. While cash benefits would not suffice to foster convergence towards a common 
status – since they are most often awarded on the basis of previous contributions or 
income tests – full decommodification (Titmuss 2001 [1964]; Esping-Andersen 1990) 
or benefits in kind play a central role in asserting principles of equal access and equal 
rights. Equal rights presume that access is universal and unconditional.5 As put by 
Richard Titmuss: 
The major positive achievement which has resulted from the creation of direct, 
universalistic social services in kind has been the erosion of formal discriminatory 
barriers. One publicly approved standard of service, irrespective of income, 
3 Monetary benefits are divided in contributory benefits and non-contributory, either universal (ex-ante) 
or means-tested (ex-post). 
4 Market failures undermine the maximization of total output and bring reflect economic inefficiency, 
which the welfare state is designed to minimize. 
5 Unconditionality and universality are also the two fundamental principles that make the case for the 
currently-discussed proposal for basic income, defined as an unconditional and universal monetary 
income guaranteed for all members of a political community (nation) by the state, independently 
of her personal characteristics such as age, race, sex, social class, income, etc. The goal is to 
foster citizenship and common ground on the basis that all citizens share values and therefore the 
resources of the nation on an equal basis.  
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class, or race, replaced the double standard which invariably meant second 
class services for second class citizens (Titmuss 2001 [1964]: 110).
This explains why universal access to health care, daycare, care for the elderly or 
education differs substantially from providing individuals or families with voucher 
schemes (equivalent to cash), aiming at guaranteeing personal choice and competition 
as a way of improving efficiency through pro-market devices. Social protection 
encompasses both cash and in kind benefits because the later and the former achieve 
different goals in terms of preserving and enhancing well-being. Though income support 
varies considerably, either in the form of contributory benefits or non-contributory ones, 
they have been tailored for purposes of insurance, smooth consumption and poverty 
relief. They tackle primarily income deficits and help in solving problems of market 
failures. In contrast, benefits in kind address other complex issues referring to equality 
of opportunity, and therefore are intimately related to equity issues.6 
A vast and diverse body of literature (Esping-Andersen 1990; Pierson 1996; 
Pontusson 2005; Huber and Stephens 2012; Boyer [forthcoming], just to cite a few) 
has consistently displayed evidence that the more universal social protection systems 
are, the more redistributive their impact is. This led authors such as Korpi and Palme 
(1998) to identify, on the grounds of empirical analysis, the “paradox of redistribution”, 
considering that Western welfare regimes that targeted the poor most heavily, actually 
turned out to have redistributed much less than expected. This should have come as 
no surprise given that the gradual evolution of social protection schemes over the 20th 
century towards more universality and unconditionality, echoing the understanding that 
targeting and selectivity had a marginal impact in redistributing well-being and promoting 
a more homogenous, prosperous and integrated society. Evelyne Huber and John D. 
Stephens (2012) reasserted these findings based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
data: once again, Scandinavian countries stand out as the most effective in reducing 
poverty and inequality, for they provide large, universal and decommodified services. 
Countries whose welfare system predominantly focuses on means-test benefits to 
overcome severe destitution are even less capable of satisfactorily accomplishing 
poverty reduction goals. Their poverty alleviation policies and programs prove highly 
ineffectual (as illustrated by the US case). 
6 As Barr recalls with regard to non-economic arguments to justify the universal provision of public 
health, it “does not mean that individuals can necessarily obtain as much health care as they want 
(since health-care resources are scarce, no system can satisfy everyone´s wants). But it does mean 
that any individual should receive as much health care as anyone else in the same medical condition, 
regardless of any factors that are thought to be irrelevant – for example income. The same argument 
applies to education”  (Barr 2012: 233-4) and the like.
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1.3. How Financial-Led Markets Undermine De-commodification
The point we make echoes a continuing debate that emphasizes that the structure 
of the welfare provision matters and should not be neglected, especially in countries, 
such as in Latin America, where the social protection edifice is just taking roots or, 
at best, remains incomplete and imperfect. This is the case of the pioneer countries 
in implementing social insurance schemes, which is the case of Argentina, Uruguay, 
Costa Rica, Brazil, and Chile, according to the typology established by Carmelo Mesa-
Lago (2005). Huber and Stephens (2012), in their most recent book, examine this 
same aspect, relating to the structure of social policies in Latin American countries, 
but they argue from a distinct stand point, building a case for the adoption of a model 
of basic universalism in the region. Acknowledging this concern means considering 
not only access to entitlements and the extensiveness of entitlements, but conditions 
of this access (Lo Vuolo 2013a; Lavinas et al. 2012; Cobo 2012) as well as the type 
of benefit that is provided (Lavinas 2007). For us, universality and unconditionality 
constitute inseparable dimensions of access to and effective use of benefits from social 
protection that arises and develops in market societies.  
The functionality of the welfare state, so effective and essential to capitalist regimes 
of any sort, as we have learned so definitely from Karl Polanyi (1944), supposes 
that its design is constantly adapting to meet the new challenges derived from the 
accumulation regime and contradictions of capitalism. One may then assume that the 
notion of “welfare capitalism” – and what it embodies regardless of its contours – is a 
specific, radical and conflicting arrangement, subject to disputes on the grounds of the 
extensiveness of the rights it ensures, forms of access, and also means of financing. 
The state will always stand by the market supporting social reproduction and “serving 
the legitimation needs of a new form of capitalism” (Fraser 2009: 113).
Notwithstanding, in the last quarter of the 20th century, under the hegemony of neoliberal 
ideas, the responsiveness of social protection systems has been partly undermined, 
especially in Western economies whose welfare states are largely financed through 
current contributions by employers and employees. By contrast, this contribution-
based distortion did not occur in Scandinavian countries, where markets are strongly 
regulated, and the bulk of social protection is tax-funded, ensuring redistribution and 
common patterns. Consequently, the welfare edifice has been renovated with no harm 
to its foundations (Boyer [forthcoming]; Kvist and Greeve 2011). Also in the neoliberal 
reform process, another model or a reconfiguration of welfare capitalism surfaced 
redefining the relationship between markets and the state. Rather than compensating 
for market failures and market distortions through social regulations, the state is 
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expected to play a more active role in pushing for and strengthening market forces to 
stimulate sustained economic growth. This move from a wide-ranging state intervention 
towards a more market-driven system (Huber 2002) alters the state’s role and mode of 
functioning to make them compatible with a new casting of prerogatives. By the same 
token, the architecture of welfare capitalism is remodeled. 
It comes thus as no surprise that the concept tailored to replace the welfare state is the 
one of the enabling state (Gilbert 2004) which means the demise of state-sponsored 
care and social protection. Instead of decommodified rights and free and unconditional 
access to rights, the enabling state or the activist state is expected to provide “public 
support for private responsibility” (Gilbert 2004: 43). The state is called to act as a 
lever to facilitate market integration rather than rectify “the play of market forces” 
(Briggs 1961: 228), even with regard to specific provisions that cannot be appropriately 
provided by the market for engendering shortages and inefficiencies. 
This shift is not trivial, quite the contrary. Universal and public provision implies that the 
state is responsible for delivering services and goods for society as a whole, whereas 
private provision corrupts the idea of public goods to which all citizens are entitled. 
Rather than rights, under this new rationale, people are concerned with entitlements 
whose access will be guaranteed provided they make an effort to fulfill their obligations, 
which are now marketed as the “freedom to make choices.” It makes the dangerous 
supposition that asymmetries of power and information, to say the least, do not exist 
in market societies, which undermines social cohesion. Moreover, this coercive 
dimension (veiled in an emphasis on self-responsibility) re-legitimizes selectivity as a 
form of social regulation, renewing practices that prevailed in times where inequality 
was tolerated and justified as a result of different levels of rewards determined by 
different levels of individual effort and labor. 
In systematizing the main features of the enabling state as opposed to the welfare 
state, Neil Gilbert (2004) points out privatization versus public provision, promoting 
work rather than protecting labor; selective targeting instead of universal rights, and 
solidarity of membership (shared values and civil duties) versus solidarity of citizenship 
(shared rights). It is noteworthy to stress that the idea of rights is supplanted by that of 
duty, which casts fulfillment as a precondition to reward. Rewards, not rights, constitute 
the touchstone of the neoliberal approach to social protection. Gilbert’s framework 
nurtured the debate opposing residual welfare states to universal welfare states in 
Western countries. De-commodification was to contract in order for new markets to 
expand.  The fiscal crisis fuelled arguments in favor of pro-market strategies. 
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1.4. From Equal Citizens to Equal Consumers, and from Risk-Sharing to   
 Individual Risk-Taking 
In parallel, a similar pro-market oriented approach arose, this time tailored to respond 
to the necessities of developing countries, challenged by growing poverty and several 
adverse effects of globalization and the debt crisis therapy imposed by the Washington 
Consensus. Under the auspices of the World Bank, this social risk management strategy 
was framed and launched (Holzmann and Jørgensen 2000) in order to uphold market 
forces by reducing the magnitude of subsistence patterns, poverty levels, non-monetary 
activities, in sum by spreading market norms and rationale, via commodification. This 
framework endorses a set of public initiatives that range from guaranteeing means-test 
safety nets for the extreme poor to easing access to financial markets, through diverse 
forms of micro-insurance and micro-credit for those slightly better off. According to 
Robert Holzmann and Steen Jørgensen, this strategy “consists of public interventions 
(i) to assist individuals, households and communities better manage risk; and ii) to 
provide support for the critically poor” (Holzmann and Jørgensen 2000: 6). The scope 
of state intervention is undoubtedly and sharply tightened. 
On the one hand, a better way to manage risk would be by enhancing private insurance 
schemes, delivered by the financial sector, in order to tackle unmet demand relating 
to medical services, or unexpected and costly contingencies such as funerals, etc. 
Private micro-insurance would compensate for the lack of savings experienced by poor 
and vulnerable households and for the state’s ineptness. At the same time, it would 
also boost the banking system in areas where it remains relatively weak, for markets 
are incipient. A large variety of persistent “needs” were to be addressed by the banking 
system and other correlated institutions (brokers and other private providers, such 
as cooperatives,7 etc.) now currently in charge of supplying the needy with the right 
financial product or service. On the other hand, microfinance and microcredit programs 
designed to take over from more informal and irregular schemes would deepen monetary 
relations and expand markets in all realms and dimensions, particularly in relation to 
entrepreneurial activities. As is known, salaried relations are far from prevalent among 
the poor and the most vulnerable in the developing world (Lavinas and Martins 2013). 
The share of salaried wage relations tends to increase with average earnings, curbing 
informality. It is then necessary, in times of labor market flexibilization, to promote 
working alternatives for those who are very unlikely to enter the salaried world and 
enjoy entitlements derived from occupational status. For these, microfinance is the 
most appropriate tool to lift them from subsistence levels, allowing risk-taking, either 
7 The ILO among other UN organizations has sponsored small-scale micro-health insurance in the 
developing world, especially where public provision failed. 
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in the agricultural sector or as an urban merchant or in micro-business.  Risk-sharing 
strategies suck as social insurance or universal provision are to be replaced by financial 
derivatives.  
But the critically poor do not fully fit into this scheme, since their income deficit is so 
dramatic that it hampers any chance of adopting private micro-insurance on an individual 
basis or applying for microcredit loans to open a business. The severe destitution 
of the worst off is then tackled with cash transfers conditional on the acceptance of 
new regulations and responsibilities in accordance with the demands of an emerging 
form of capitalism (Fraser 2009), which is now global. Women, especially mothers, 
are made responsible in ensuring compliance with the conditions imposed by a newly-
packaged array of programs. As the nominal beneficiaries, they must obey the rules and 
optimize scarce resources. Yet again women are held accountable (Molyneux 2006; 
Chant 2007; Lavinas et al. 2012; Hulme and Mosley 1996) for managing scarcity, in a 
clear reproductive role with reaffirmation of a subordinate standard of gender relations 
inside the family.
Rather than risk-sharing on the grounds of a single status, that of citizens, the core 
idea is that of individual responsibility (Gilbert 2004), which entails obligations duly 
fulfilled. Individual responsibility results in individual entitlements narrowly redefined as 
empowerment through the market (Schild 2013). It is through the notion of individual 
responsibility that selectivity is restored from the perspective of the deserving and the 
undeserving, breaking with the rationale of universal and unconditional rights.  
It is not a coincidence that, through the strategy of social risk management, a focus 
of the financial sector for anti-poverty measures arose as a quasi-panacea in the 
developing world, where the expansion of capital markets was raising serious concerns. 
One may recall that in the mid-1990s, markets for credit and insurance targeted to 
the poor were nearly nonexistent. Then incipient, they relied on experiments such 
as the Grameen Bank (India), BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee), 
BancoSol (Bolivia) and other similar financial interventions (most modeled on the 
Grameen Bank), all launched in an era of severe structural adjustments and growing 
poverty. A very robust and consistent comparative study carried out throughout the 
1980s and 1990s by David Hulme and Paul Mosley in 1996, long before conditional 
cash transfers turned out to prevail as a poverty reduction strategy, points out that 
microcredit schemes (1) have had, at best, a marginal impact in overcoming structural 
factors that reproduce poverty, such as job constraints (these constraints are instead 
lifted by a more dynamic economic environment); (2) may increase exposure to risk, 
deepening vulnerability, and therefore raising the likelihood of a crisis aggravating 
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poverty; (3) did not guarantee security in old age providing a quasi-pension income 
benefit (the poor continue to be reliant on families and  neighbors); (4)  could not been 
considered a step forward in empowering women (higher female participation rates in 
credit loans do not automatically reflect gender empowerment, quite the contrary); and 
v) had been ineffective in reaching the core-poor, instead mainly benefiting upper- and 
middle-income poor households, a minority more likely to cross the poverty line. In sum, 
credit impact in reducing poverty has been quite modest, to say the least. In addition 
to claiming that “there has been a gross exaggeration in that part of the literature on 
credit schemes” as a way of alleviating poverty (Hulme and Mosley 1996: 134), the 
authors assert that promotional strategies of poverty reduction focusing on access to 
credit loans in order to persistently raise low incomes and lift families out of poverty 
require, to be successful, “other social security mechanisms – employment guarantees 
schemes, food-for-work programs, drought relief, indigenous welfare practices” (Hulme 
and Mosley 1996: 134).  And they conclude that, on top of developing a second wave 
of innovation to provide new financial services to the poor, it is indispensable to couple 
this promotional strategy with a protective one. This move forward was decisively 
achieved with the consolidation of conditional cash transfers. This safety-net modality 
provided the cushion not only to cope with indigence but also to reduce unreasonable 
risk-taking on the part of the poor finally dragged into the financial markets. 
As a consequence of a renewed and broader approach on how to shape financial 
services to the poor, training programs and technical assistance for the most vulnerable 
(Lavinas and Ferraz 2010) about the basic rules of borrowing and managing loans 
have proliferated in the developing world, run by NGOs and public institutions, in praise 
of microcredit (Banerjee and Duflo 2011). In Latin America, for instance, talks and 
short-term courses on the subject have been often assigned to recipients of safety net 
programs, tying them together. A new term has been coined, namely the “bankarization” 
of the poor which means bridging the gap between a huge unmet demand for cheap 
and short-term loans and the financial system, which has long remained closed to 
those lacking collateral. The current phase of financialization of the world economy 
forced a reform of capital markets, in particular the credit sector in middle income and 
low income countries. Incomplete markets, or missing markets, as they are known, 
were improved to provide special loans and reach specific groups that were bankless 
(which means they were not integrated into the formal financial sector). What could 
foster self-responsibility further and deeper than increased individual borrowing? 
It is significant to call attention to the pivotal role assigned to cash transfers in this 
context. Instead of being one intrinsic and entrenched dimension of social protection 
designed to deliver whatever necessary to reduce vulnerability and prevent destitution, 
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income transfers targeted to the poor are turned into the central ingredient used in the 
retrenchment of welfare capitalism. Not only are they tailored to tackle poverty, but they 
are also intended to extend and boost commodification. In this way, they represent a 
sharp break with the long-established goals of universalism and de-commodification.
But why is poverty such an important target? Poverty is a priority under the new 
market-oriented social protection regime because it presents a major threat to the 
expansion of global markets – the overriding form of contemporary capitalism – for 
it heightens market failures and negative externalities. Neo-liberal policymakers and 
theorists are very much concerned by poverty, not for reasons of social justice or equity 
– which would entail surmounting the status divide reproduced by double standards 
– but primarily for reasons of economic efficiency. As emphatically claimed by an IMF 
representative in a Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)/ILO Seminar in Berlin, “there is no 
vibrant economy if there are no consumers.”8     
We therefore witness a reconfiguration in terms of combining new means for prosperity 
with search for security.  Market societies now under the hegemony of the financial 
sector assign a distinct role for welfare capitalism, in which assets, stocks, credit, and 
capital devices prevail as the generators of corporate profit and social accumulation. 
This is a break from the traditional capital-labor relation that dominated the golden era 
of manufacturing capitalism which demanded protection against certain risks (a social 
contract) and unpredictable events (a common lot) through public risk-averse pooling 
strategies based on solidarity and managed by the state.  
In the current finance-led accumulation regime, labor relations have been flexibilized 
and profits are not expected to be shared even marginally. Redistribution is thus at stake 
from within the system´s rationale, under the argument that tightening labor cost and 
capital gain tax exemptions are the present-day mechanisms to foster competitiveness 
and offset various trade-offs9 that may undermine the likelihood of national success in 
the global economy. There is little room for redistribution through wages and earnings, 
in particular in the most developed economies, which is the prime reason for growing 
inequality in the present time as so many authors have recently claimed (Hacker and 
Pierson 2010; Stiglitz 2012; Galbraith 2012; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). Actually, there 
is less room for redistribution per se since tax cuts lead to curtailing social spending. 
8 Quotation from Elliot Harris, FES-ILO Seminar on the Social Protection Floor, Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung/ILO  (Berlin, November 2012).
9 Even within the new regime, different fiscal and taxes regimes, exchange rate regimes, and 
institutions such as the presence of a national minimum wage can be identified in larger or smaller 
welfare states. 
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And if companies delocalize looking for lower production costs and a more advantageous 
tax system to the developing world, one may expect that earnings and wages in those 
societies newly integrated to the market will certainly rise but up to a certain limit 
pressed between a very low bottom as point of departure and a ceiling that is still fairly 
low compared to usual average earnings in advanced economies.10 It is here where 
credit and access to capital markets become the lever to promote and deepen the 
integration of the worse off into the market society. Credit loans, new financial products 
and the like become the key elements to foster growth, signaling that the social mode 
of regulation has been transformed so as to capture the poor, the indigent, and the 
vulnerable that far outnumber the very rich and the middle class. In a vibrant economy 
all must share the status of consumers. The new universalist goal is therefore not 
equal citizens but instead equal consumers. And as for other consumers, even the very 
poor are supposed to be able to increase their consumption through credit, which is no 
longer tightly tied to rising wage earnings. 
In parallel, despite greater unpredictability in the world economy, the ideology that 
dominates the present time is that the state became unreliable and inept at delivering 
services in a scope capable of managing the accelerating evolution of changes and 
risks, a critique which directly leads to policies that hold individuals, not the state, 
responsible for managing risks. To better prepare those who are very likely to be 
immediately plagued by economic downturns to survive through uncertainty, banks, 
private insurance, and the financial sector as a whole appear as the new “providers of 
means” suitable for the task, since the state can no longer be trusted. They enable, or 
empower (in the cynical vernacular of its proponents) those who used to be excluded, 
forgotten, and disqualified. And in so doing, rather than a process of dis-individualisation 
(Rosanvallon 2011) that paved the way towards the consolidation of welfare states, 
the move is towards a remodeled relationship between one´s social condition and 
the trajectory chosen, breaking with principles of public risk-sharing in favor of self-
responsibility and risk-taking. 
It is not accidental that on both sides of the neoliberal reform spectrum that hit 
Latin America in the 90s – either through individual private accounts fully-funded as 
means of pensions or access to credit loans for those with no or little collateral to 
overcome poverty – the rationale was not only market-oriented but notably capital 
market-oriented. Strengthening Latin American stock markets through the privatization 
of public pension systems (World Bank 1999) and expanding the financial system 
through mass consumption founded on access to credit for those at the bottom of the 
10 Bértola and Ocampo (2012) have compiled data which prove that many gaps between Latin American 
countries and the developed economies have continued to deepen over the last century, despite the 
fact that Latin America has displayed high rates of economic growth. 
 Lavinas - Anti-Poverty Schemes Instead of Social Protection  | 14
distribution with sharp income deficits are two sides of the same coin, especially when 
decommodified social spending is cut down. Both providing income security for the 
elderly, and enabling the worst-off to escape poverty, are strategies to be achieved 
through capital markets. Such a rationale is radically opposed to decommodification, 
for decommodification undermines the scale and scope of capital markets as the new 
welfare providers through private insurance on one hand, and private loans (for any 
purpose) on the other. This process of commodifying life from cradle to grave, including 
now those with nearly no or few resources to have access to financial markets, stands 
out as the antithesis of the Beveridge model of social protection. Fraser (2012: 1) has 
genuinely summarized this trajectory by phrasing it as “commodification all the way 
down.” 
To what extent is commodification being propelled in Latin America through the adoption 
of conditional cash transfer programs, which became paramount in the region over the 
last decade?  Are they capable of establishing a new pattern of redistribution as a 
poverty reduction strategy? Are they complementing previous social insurance schemes 
that were deficient, and, thus, adding to the consolidation of comprehensive welfare 
regimes in Latin America? For, as we may see in the following section, monetary income 
transfers constitute, after a period of retrenchment due to privatization experiments 
with social insurance schemes, the growing bulk of social protection systems in Latin 
America. 
2. Safety Nets in Latin America: A Breakthrough 
2.1. Reforming Social Insurance and Fighting Poverty
It might be worthwhile to very briefly outline the major characteristics of social 
insurance schemes11 prevailing in Latin America under the so-called period of state-
led import substitution, which lasted from the 1940s to the 1980s, even though some 
contributory benefits were instituted long before. In effect, Argentina, Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Chile, Cuba, and Uruguay, the pioneer countries as depicted by Mesa-Lago in his 
vast and outstanding intellectual work on the subject, introduced work injury, disability 
and sickness benefits relating to temporary incapacity very early on, influenced by 
the Bismarckian model. Despite being one of the very first modalities of social policy 
provision in the region, these contributory pension schemes have long remained poorly 
11 We share Huber and Stephens‘s (2012)  concerns in defining Latin America diverse social protection 
schemes in their embryonic phase as social policy regimes, and thus averting the use of welfare 
states, a category that does not apply for one reason mainly: because in their beginnings these 
regimes were neither comprehensive (incorporating different dimensions of risk-aversion, poverty 
alleviation, etc.) nor reflexive (social policy was as not seen as a mechanism to boost the domestic 
market and sustain quasi-boom cycles of economic growth). 
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managed, institutionally weak, and financially fragile. Notwithstanding, little by little the 
Latin American working classes came to back up and to rely on these programs as a 
means of guaranteeing smooth consumption  in their old age. 
Huber and Stephens (2012: 29) recall that “the leading role in social policy formation 
was played by the populist leaders” in their attempt to break with the political and 
economic dominance of the agrarian oligarchies and build modern nation-states, 
backed by emerging urban classes. In this process of institution-building, carried out 
by corporatist states, a focus on organized labor and social insurance schemes then 
prevailed, reinforcing meritocratic values, which, in turn, segregated beneficiaries. 
As a result, most institutional social insurance arrangements, whatever their format, 
were public pay-as-you-go systems, but offered limited coverage, and excluded the 
bulk of the population, that is breadwinners occupied either in informal activities or in 
the agricultural sector as well as their dependents. As summarized by Colin M. Lewis 
and Peter Lloyd-Sherlock (2009: 113), “distinct conditions and entitlements applied 
to different categories of workers and coverage was conditional on employment.” 
The state acknowledged “wage citizenship” (dos Santos 1979; Lo Vuolo 2013a) and 
assured entitlements solely on the basis of regular occupational status. Therefore, 
contributory schemes remained a privilege for few workers and corporate groups. Even 
today, across the region, an average of only 43% of households have some sort of 
contributory protection (ECLAC 2012: 30), the majority concentrated in few countries. 
In Brazil for instance, under the military dictatorship, concerns with growing inefficiencies 
and the need to expand the financial base of the system led to an administrative reform 
to technically improve its management and also extend social protection to other 
non-salaried groups, provided they made contributions on a regular basis. In spite of 
strengthening the insurance based scheme by incorporating voluntary contributors, 
therefore altering the mandatory principle of the Bismarckian model, benefits continued 
to vary according to the working status of each category, reinforcing stratification bias 
and inequalities among the beneficiaries. This risk-sharing model, though somewhat 
extended, failed to standardize benefits, and to universalize rights and common 
patterns to enable access to greater well-being. By the end of the 1970s, nearly all 
Latin American countries enjoyed some sort of contributory social insurance systems 
(Mesa-Lago 2007). As Camila Arza puts it, “among formal workers, retirement became 
institutionalized as a legitimate stage in the lifecourse” (Arza 2013: 87). 
Along with public education, pension and retirement benefits represented the vast 
majority of social spending. Healthcare was mostly provided through unions and other 
worker’s organizations but only for contributors to the system. The rest of the population 
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made do with either out-of-pocket private services for the wealthiest, or philanthropic 
and charity attention offered occasionally by churches and other religious associations 
in emergency cases. Social welfare was not formally instituted as a state responsibility, 
except when it came to addressing and reprimanding deviant behaviors (juvenile 
delinquents or single mothers) through corrective and coercive targeted programs. 
Prior to the 1990s, poverty alleviation programs in Latin America were restricted and 
usually provided temporary relief through milk programs and foodstuffs (Lavinas and 
Garcia 2004). In Mexico, for instance, food subsidies were channeled via the Program 
Tortibono, with no specific targeting, guaranteeing access to tortillas de maize. These 
programs frequently served as a political currency for electoral purposes, fostering 
clientelistic practices and backing populist coalitions. Given that poverty has long been 
equated with hunger and malnutrition, the common approach to poverty at that time 
was to alleviate food insecurity in contexts of dramatic shortages due to crisis in the 
supply side, high inflation, or humanitarian risks.12 
However, the decisive push towards the adoption of safety nets resulted from the severe 
fiscal and economic crisis of the 1980s and its adverse social impacts on most countries 
in the region. The 1990s inherited the dramatic consequences of high inflation rates, 
low growth, high unemployment, decline in real minimum wages and average earnings, 
widespread informality and the remedy that followed, that is the implementation of 
structural adjustment policies which compounded the level of destitution and poverty. 
According to ECLAC (2012), at that time, Latin America witnessed a significant upswing 
in poverty and indigence rates: the poverty rate went up from 40.5% in 1980 to 48.4% 
in 1990, including a rise in indigence rates from 18.6% to 22.6%. This downward trend 
threw an additional 68 million people into poverty. In 1990, the number of those living 
in poverty reached 204 million people compared to 136 million ten years before. 
Rosemary Thorp (1998) underlines the fact that the shift towards free market policies 
resulted in growing deregulation, provoking “rises in food and some public utility prices 
[with] serious consequences on social welfare” (Thorp 1998: 225). Food insecurity was 
severely aggravated by market liberalization as well as new trade agreements that 
profoundly disorganized subsistence crops (the case of Mexico after the creation of 
NAFTA is outstanding in this respect). In many countries, peasants and family farmers 
had their subsistence and productive activities rendered unviable by land counter-
reforms that reinforced the conservative modernization of the agricultural sector, 
12 One major historical reform – agrarian reform -- that could have remedied and redressed starvation, 
undernourishment and extreme poverty in several Latin American countries has not been truly 
appreciated, although gaining momentum from the 1990s onward. Although meaningful in the 
agenda of redemocratization, it has not been seriously considered at the policy level. 
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concentrating land and dragging the peasantry into market relations where they were 
supposed to compete. Thorp consistently adds that “capitalist farmers benefited from 
the liberalization of land, labor and financial markets, the further opening of the economy 
to international competition , the new drive to exports, and the withdrawal of supportive 
measures for the peasant sector” (Thorp 1998: 236).  Moreover, in other countries, 
like Ecuador, cuts in subsidies that used to apply to gas, oil, and medicine provoked 
a salient downfall in living conditions (Minteguiaga 2012).  The region also witnessed 
important shifts in national tax systems, with salaried employees’ personal income tax 
benefited from deductions and several tax breaks, while sales and consumption taxes 
which affected all segments of society rose, to the detriment of the most impoverished. 
It then became urgent to provide a cushion to deal with the consequences of the 
process of economic liberalization that harmfully affected the labor market and 
obstructed changes aiming at improving the performance of the social protection 
mechanisms available. Moreover, cuts in social spending, due to the debt crisis, 
aggravated the situation even further (Mesa-Lago 1997). Per capita social spending 
fell 10 percent in real terms in the course of the 1980s, income distribution worsened, 
open unemployment surged and informality exploded (Thorp 1998: 220-221). For Luis 
Bértola and Jose Ocampo (2012), in the early 1990s, primary spending (i.e., excluding 
interest payments on public debt) was as low as 13% of the average regional GDP 
(Bértola and Ocampo 2012: 233).  The ensuing social security crisis strengthened 
the argument for structural reforms, particularly in social insurance schemes pointing 
towards a broader participation of the private sector, although in divergent degrees. 
(Mesa-Lago 1997: 497).
Even though the World Bank and the IMF have played a leading role in imposing 
the privatization of public social insurance in Latin America,13 via conditionalities tied 
to credit loans, up through the mid-1990s both multilateral institutions repeatedly 
opposed providing any amount of cash to the needy, in particular in middle income 
and low income countries. They took issue with this course of action on the grounds 
that the poor are unable to make efficient choices (in kind benefits – almost exclusively 
foodstuffs - would therefore override their preferences and ensure good consumption) 
and that governments in the developing world have no fiscal capacity to guarantee 
such safety net programs. 
13 Authors like Huber and Stephens (2012: 41) acknowledge that social policy developments in Latin 
America by the end of the last century were affected by the actions and ideology deployed by the IMF 
and the World Bank. 
 Lavinas - Anti-Poverty Schemes Instead of Social Protection  | 18
This approach changed in the wake of the globalization process of the 90s, leading 
these organizations to re-conceptualize the role of social policies for the developing 
world.  Conditional cash transfers were to play a central role in this swing. 
In short, two distinct strategies, though not really constituting a model, at least in the 
beginning, persisted. On one hand, the public pension system was to be privatized 
as an incentive to enhance the take up rate of the elderly eligible for pensions, and 
reduce the public fiscal burden derived from shifts in demographics (population aging) 
coupled with low growth and high rates of informality and precariousness among the 
region´s working population.14 The overhaul of the pay-as-you-go system in favor of 
fully funded private accounts would absolve the state from the responsibility of coping 
with the burdens of a lingering legacy: the structural heterogeneity of the Latin American 
economy and society (Pinto 1970). 
On the other hand, the “enabling” state would play a greater role in enhancing market 
rationale along with reducing poverty and indigence, given that high levels of severe 
destitution represented a threat to market liberalization. Who would pay for the new 
services to be delivered by the private sector, such as pensions, health, electricity, water, 
communication and other public utilities which made up the bulk of the privatization 
process in Latin America? One should keep in mind that Latin America became a 
leader in privatization in the 1990s (Thorp 1998). Everything was then commodified, 
and in many countries conversion to the new neoliberal paradigm was abrupt and 
radical. Some few countries, by contrast, resisted. 
Chile was the precursor of this radical process of market liberalization in all respects, 
since such ideas materialized back in the 1970s under authoritarian rule. It was the 
pioneer country both in exclusively adopting a compulsory pension system of individual 
capitalization, administered by private profit institutions15 and in implementing the first 
regional safety net scheme, named Subsidio Unitario Familiar, in 1981. A monetary 
stipend of 6 USD per month was granted to indigent mothers with children of school 
going age, conditional on school attendance, pregnant women, and women involved 
with care responsibilities for disabled people. It was an inexpensive and extremely 
small scale cash transfer program, since less than one thousand beneficiaries were 
reached for a total cost of 0.09% of the GDP.  With regard to their new pension regime, 
the Chilean system of private accounts was expected to increase the average value of 
retirement benefits, covering a higher share of the population aged 65 and over. The 
14 ECLAC and Thorp (1998) display strong evidence to support growing informality in the 1980s in the 
region.
15 The public pension system ceased, except for the military who continued to be entitled to retirement 
benefits. 
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greater incentive to achieve this aim, beyond coercion, relied on the assumption that 
individuals, either formal workers or self-employed, would be eager to make regular 
contributions to personal accounts, rather than contributing to a general public system. 
The future was to show that these assumptions did not hold. 
Argentina also experimented in this area, privatizing part of the public social security 
system in 1993 (pensions, initially, and some public facilities, as water, later on). A 
mixed public-private pension system of fully funded individual pension accounts was 
created under the same rationale of increasing retirees’ coverage. The first safety 
net program16 applied by the Argentinian government was introduced only in 1997 
– the Programa Nacional de Becas Estudiantiles. It targeted adolescents from poor 
backgrounds, yet again conditioned on school attendance.17 Later on new modalities 
of conditional cash transfers appeared as an attempt to cope with the fallout of the 
end of the convertibility regime. In 2002, the federal government launched Programa 
Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados, a workfare program in Ruben Lo Vuolo’s terms 
(2013b: 53), since “households were assigned a task, whether in service training or in-
job assignment in a productive activity. Coverage was huge in relative terms but impact 
on poverty and unemployment was not relevant.” 
Bolivia did not escape the wave of liberal reforms and underwent profound and 
unprecedented changes in various sectors, let alone in its low-coverage and very 
ineffective pension program. In 1996, the latter was completely privatized, giving 
rise to Bonasol, a collective capitalization fund, which was expected to finance future 
retirement pensions. The private scheme was intended for the population aged 65 or 
over, while the average life expectancy of Bolivia at that time was only 59 years old. The 
mismanagement of the system and persisting structural problems relating to finance 
hampered its advancement. Its major achievement was to attract foreign investments to 
the country. The number of recipients, while presumed to grow, plummeted drastically. 
Poverty soared to peaks: in the course of the 1980s and the 1990s, the incidence of 
poverty persisted in levels above 60%.
Mesa-Lago (2007) stresses the fact that in Mexico, as a consequence of the privatization 
of social insurance, the share of the elderly granted a pension benefit dropped from 
37% in 1997 to 30% in 2002. By the same token, the proportion of regular salaried 
16 One should point out that social assistance cash transfers became widespread in the developing 
world in the 1990s, well beyond Latin America, as indicated by Leivering (2009). Uzbekistan, China, 
Zambia had adopted them at that time, and were followed in the 2000s by South Korea, Mozambique, 
and other countries. No common norms apply, for some remain rudimentary schemes, whereas 
other are better implemented and managed. Scales vary, but the rationale is the same. 
17 The program´s cost amounted to 0.03% of GDP and it benefitted only 350,000 children. 
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workers and also informal ones who paid contributions to private individual accounts 
fell significantly, to 39.3% in 2003 as compared to 63.4% in 1998, reflecting labor 
market downturns. Lack of protection grew along with poverty rates. The Programa 
Nacional de Solidaridad or Pronasol initiated under Carlos Salinas in 1989 was, then, 
replaced by Progresa – Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación  (1997) – which 
was sold as a model for addressing rural poverty and gender schooling gaps through 
conditional cash transfers (CCTs).  It was urgent to extend the coverage of safety nets 
to provide at least some modest relief. The third generation of CCTs in Mexico was 
brought forward by Oportunidades, whose major accomplishment was to expand even 
more the program coverage, reaching 5.8 million families with an average monthly 
transfer of 65 dollars per household (Yanes 2013).  
Likewise Chile, Argentina, Mexico and Bolivia, other Latin-American countries 
(Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, and El Salvador amidst others) followed the World 
Bank reform prescriptions (Palacios 1996) and introduced partial shifts endorsing 
privatization, liberalization, and the consolidation of stock markets. One may recall that 
these reforms aimed at expanding welfare coverage, by ensuring fiscal sustainability 
and developing capital markets, the latter considered relatively small and feeble. Yet, 
as the World Bank recognized ten years later in another position document, Keeping 
the Promise of Old Age Income Security in Latin America (Gill et al. 2004), the results 
from this wave of privatizations fell far below expectations. These structural reforms 
all failed to expand compliance and improve coverage rates. And as poverty grew, 
especially among the elderly, partially due to the dismantling of previous public pension 
regimes, safety nets had to develop to offset deeper income deficits and growing 
vulnerability. John Sheahan properly argues that Latin American problems did not 
emerge with liberalization, although some have been exacerbated under economic 
liberalization and concludes: “liberalization has clearly not been a remedy” (Sheahan 
2002: 44). 
2.2. Counter-Reforms: Back to Public Provision of Pension Benefits 
Despite great transformations in the incomplete and predominantly regressive 
social policy systems in the region, which led “many politicians and technocrats [to 
view] the ‘liberal agenda’ as a way to reconcile demands for greater fiscal discipline 
with pressures to address the needs of the previously excluded groups” (Haggard 
and Kaufman 2008: 265), the result of the liberal reforms when achieved made it 
evident that the major challenges remained relatively untouched and awaited a more 
effective solution.  This led to a second wave of reforms around the year 2000, this 
time committed to public provision, progressivity, equity and social inclusion. These 
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counter-reforms18 were championed by new political leadership and popular coalitions 
devoted to a democratic social agenda and to the return of economic growth. In most 
Latin American countries where liberalization and privatization reforms prevailed, the 
reversal took place: the provision of certain goods and services became mostly public 
again, and fiscal revenues were also reintegrated to the financing structure of the 
national social protection system.
The novelty of the 2000s, then, is the context of counter-reforms in order to muddle 
through the negative effects of the liberalization process and the deterioration of the 
social insurance coverage in many Latin American countries after the finance-led 
reforms of the 1990s. 
After 20 years of a fully funded pension system, Chile passed a pension reform bill in 
2008, under President Michelle Bachelet, which reintroduced a non-contributory, state-
financed solidarity pillar, soon incorporated into the contributory pension system. Arza 
asserts that “Chile adopted a reform which was at the same time path dependent and 
innovative. It maintained individual accounts and at the same time introduced a new 
pension pillar to guarantee better coverage for the elderly with insufficient contributory 
records and/or low pension savings” (Arza 2013: 95).  Successful counter-reforms 
can be also observed in Argentina, where the second pillar of the funded pension 
regime was renationalized in 2008, contributing to a 23 percent rise in pensioners’ 
coverage (from 62% in 2005 to 85% in 2010) for those 60 or over (Arza 2012). This 
was made possible by a moratorium granted to the elderly who failed to comply with 
their contribution records.  They were given a second chance to pay back their pending 
contributions but at the same time, in doing so, were entitled to a pension benefit, if all 
requirements were met, as well as health insurance.  Millions were brought back into 
the system as beneficiaries. 
Bolivia, so dramatically affected by the structural adjustment of the 1990s, stands 
as the sole country in the region to set forward a universal non-contributory pension 
benefit, namely the Renta Dignidad. In 2007, Renta Dignidad took over Bonasol. It 
is guaranteed as a right of citizenship, on a monthly basis, to those 60 and over, 
irrespective of household income level, previous working record, contribution or any 
other criterion of eligibility. This reversal is a turnabout as radical as the complete 
18 Counter-reforms here designate the return to public pay-as-you-go contributory systems and/or the 
creation of public non-contributory pensions, a step already taken by Brazil since 1988.  Alongside 
the return of the public provision, then, one sees considerable redistributive effects on the basis of 
rights, and not obligations.  
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privatization Bolivia underwent in the 1990s, the distinction being that it now extended 
coverage to 97% of the eligible population (Arza 2013).  
Contrary to countries that adopted liberal reforms, and had to undertake counter-
reforms, Brazil maintained the comprehensive social protection model adopted by the 
1988 Constitution. Brazil is one of the few countries in the region to discard structural 
reforms in its pension system in favor of parametric modifications in its public pension 
system designed to enhance homogeneity between regimes (one for civil servants 
and another for workers from the private sector). Despite strong pressures for its 
dismantlement, the persistence of the public dimension of the health and the pension 
system in Brazil has been assured by the 1988 institutionalization of Brazilian Social 
Security. The fact that social security integrated contributory public pensions, basic 
pensions for all rural citizens, universal public health for all, and means-tested welfare 
schemes for the needy, backed up by a specific budget funded by exclusive taxes 
and contributions, was a determinant factor in its successfully protection from liberal 
structural reforms.  In fact, the social security system instituted the principle that the 
lowest social insurance benefit should be tied to the value of the current minimum 
wage. This principle, which applied to urban and rural pensions, radically improved 
living conditions of the elderly in rural areas.
ECLAC’s 2012 estimates support these encouraging trends: the share of the Latin 
American population aged 65 and over enjoying a pension benefit rose from 34% in 
2000 to 40% in 2009, an explicit and irrefutable signal of the positive outcomes derived 
from the public counter-reforms of the 2000s, overturning the neoliberal model of the 
1990s. 
2.3. Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Programs: An Overview of Latin   
 American Examples
2.3.1. Mexico and Brazil: Pioneers in the 1990s
The shift in favor of monetary income transfers to alleviate poverty was put forward in the 
context of these liberalizing reforms and in the light of the good outcomes brought about 
by the incoming assessments of decentralized cash transfer programs conducted both 
in Mexico and Brazil. These were two Latin American pioneers in extending minimum 
income support schemes on a wide scale, in the context of a developing country. 
However, it was only in the wake of the newly progressive governments democratically 
elected in the 2000s that these schemes were definitely bolstered throughout the 
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region. Policymaking was strengthened in the social arena thanks to cross-country 
cooperation alongside multilateral organizations eager to promote conditional cash 
transfers as a new paradigm to finally replace the disastrous model of “adjustment with 
a human face,”19 the latter imposed on developing countries in the previous decades 
of economic deregulation.  
There are two main objectives in CCT programs: short-term poverty relief (through 
income transfers) and the breaking of intergenerational cycles of poverty (via human 
capital accumulation). Although most cash transfer programs converge to these aims, 
their origins and trajectories in Latin America appear to have been driven by two 
different dynamics. 
In Brazil these programs emerged primarily at the local level (states and municipalities), 
run by center-left governments elected during the redemocratization process, mainly in 
dense metropolitan areas. At that time, a new style of antipoverty initiatives surfaced, 
breaking with the anachronistic and narrow approach to destitution expressed by 
foodstuff programs. A national push to eradicate hunger in the wake of growing food 
insecurity under high inflation, launched by civil activists put poverty as a main issue to be 
addressed by the new democracy. Initiatives associated with the concept of guaranteed 
income sprang forth, introduced in the political debate20 by scholars, politicians and 
policymakers committed to reforming the social sector. More than representing broad 
political coalitions, these newly elected governments offered those eager to participate 
in the new democratic life of the country the possibility to join a project to rebuild 
the nation from within. These were times of widespread political mobilization. In the 
wake of the defeat of the Diretas Já crusade, and under the decentralization principles 
established by the 1988 Constitution, municipalities became beacons of institutional 
innovation. They galvanized the idea of political change. Furthermore, successful 
local initiatives would illustrate the potential power of progressive forces to effectively 
change the country and propel them to the presidency at the proper time. Alongside 
Bolsa Escola, other paradigmatic initiatives like Orçamento Participativo or Programas 
19 A justification for CCTs used in several reports prepared in the UN system, the World Bank and the 
IMF.
20 For instance, in Brazil, the idea of providing a minimum income to the poor arose in the late 1970s, 
but it was not until the 1990s that it became a major issue in the national debate on combating 
inequalities, when Senator Eduardo Suplicy of the Workers’ Party presented a bill of law providing for 
a guaranteed minimum income for all Brazilian adults over 25 years of age with a monthly per capita 
family income less than USD 140.  In contrast to this approach, another form of monetary income 
transfer emerged, targeting not poor individuals but rather poor families with school-age children. 
This initiative, shaped by economist José Márcio Camargo, provided a monthly stipend equivalent to 
one minimum wage to all families, regardless of income, provided that their children were enrolled in 
the public school system. The argument for this targeted form of monetary income transfer is based 
on the understanding that limited schooling was the factor with the greatest explanatory power in the 
intergenerational reproduction of the vicious circle of poverty. 
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de Segurança Alimentar to combat hunger and inflation popped up across the country. 
Many were awarded prizes and were labeled as “a new way of governing” (Trevas et 
al. 1999). 
By the end of the 1990s, about one hundred municipalities had implemented a scheme 
inspired by the pioneering experiment established in Brasilia in 1995, the Bolsa Escola. 
The idea was to provide a cash transfer tied to school attendance by poor children ages 
7-14. This proved particularly attractive because, in addition to reducing poverty, this 
scheme was very likely to increase educational attainment (fighting drop-out rates) and 
contribute to the elimination of child labor (Lavinas 2006). Soon, Bolsa Escola became 
something of a model in Brazil, for three main reasons. First, the poverty threshold 
to identify potential beneficiaries was established at a decent level (per capita family 
income of half of a minimum wage). Secondly, the benefit was a flat rate that amounted 
to a minimum wage, a significant sum by any standard, especially given that poverty 
had never been addressed before by any regular anti-poverty policy. Finally, the take-
up rate was surprisingly high: about 80% of the target population was covered. The 
direct effect of such a well-designed policy was that the program was truly effective in 
lowering poverty, improving well-being and reducing drop-out rates, since children of 
school-going age were supposed to have an attendance rate of 75%. Moreover, rules 
were relatively flexible and no other conditionalities beyond school attendance were 
imposed. In view of the highly satisfactory results and low operational cost, safety nets 
conditional on school attendance spread throughout all regions in Brazil. 
The Cardoso government then in power had to surrender to the evidence and decided 
to extend the program nationwide. This attempt at scaling up, however, was to fail. 
No more than 1 million poor families had been reached by the end of his term, which 
amounted to barely 10% of the target population. The program was also redesigned, 
losing effectiveness: the poverty line was set at a very low level, dismissing the bulk 
of potential beneficiaries; and the benefit was cut down and tailored to distinct age 
groups, but this sum remained very low and therefore incapable of lifting families out 
of poverty.  
Contrary to Brazil, in Mexico, the first scheme targeted to alleviate extreme poverty 
and famine by guaranteeing income transfers conditional on school attendance was a 
top-down initiative, designed and implemented by the federal government. Progresa, 
created in 1997, is a national program of education, health and food benefits, aimed 
at improving the living standards of millions of rural families, particularly those who 
suffered most from the impacts of economic liberalization. The benefits paid to 
beneficiary families combined educational stipends along with a grant to support food 
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accessibility. Poor families with no children simply received the monthly food grant. 
Progresa innovated by establishing a higher school stipend for girls, whose dropout 
rates happened to be higher than their male fellows, for they were often dragged out 
of school to help her mother with domestic work. Likewise, higher stipends were paid 
at higher school grades as an incentive to increase enrollment rates in middle school. 
Another characteristic of Progresa was the concern with healthcare. Families were 
supposed to make regular visits to healthcare clinics for preventive purposes (prenatal 
care and child nutrition). Despite the growing concern with long-term well-being, in 
terms of an “integral response to reverse the privations of the population living in a 
situation of abject poverty” (Mexico, Federal Government 1998: 67), health–related 
activities within Progresa amounted to only 8% of the program budget in 1999. If the 
Mexican government were committed to implementing a more comprehensive and 
integrated approach to poverty reduction, allocating such a low share of the budget to 
general care, especially being as there was no public provision in this case, could be 
interpreted as an oversight. But this did not happen by accident - quite the contrary, as 
time would tell. 
Thus, both in Mexico and Brazil, safety nets targeted to the poor, who had been until 
then completely unprotected, turned out to be the big novelty in Latin America social 
policy, and served in turn as models for other countries in the South.
2.3.2. General Features of CCT Programs in Latin America and their Shortcomings
Some common features characterize these schemes, despite national variations (for a 
more detailed outlook of the variety of conditional cash transfers refer to Appendix 1): 
(1) the  target population is defined by means-testing and other targeting criteria; (2) 
monetary benefits are generally paid to female spouses or mothers for their ability to 
optimize scarce resources; (3) benefits tend to vary according to family size; (4) they 
are paid on a monthly basis but subject to conditionalities (i.e. provided that school 
attendance, visits to health clinics, participation in community meetings and other 
specific requirements are fulfilled); (5) controls are imperative; (6) penalties apply in 
case of non-compliance, leading beneficiary families to be removed from the official 
register and lose their  stipend.
One may say that three major pieces of evidence that support the broader case for cash 
transfers conditional on school attendance: the intensity of extreme poverty dropped 
significantly; social spending targeting the most destitute increased as a percentage of 
national GDP, improving to some extent social indicators relating to poverty; and social 
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demands arose instituting a new relationship between the state and the indigent on the 
basis of new, previously nonexistent, entitlements. 
Despite some improvements over the last five decades, Latin American countries still 
do not perform satisfactorily in addressing inequality compared to other middle income 
countries. As stressed by Kelly Hoffman and Miguel Angel Centeno (2003), evidence 
indicates that inequality would be even more skewed if the distribution of well-being 
was taken into account. The deficiency of regular, sustained public investments in living 
conditions (education, housing, sanitation, public health) fails to sufficiently address 
poverty as a whole, and reflects Latin American countries’ neglect of security and equal 
standards. The poor have long been excluded and are now confronted with making the 
correct choices to improve their own lives. But the weight of their problems, due to a 
lack of investment in social infrastructure, represents a significant challenge.
While cash transfers programs were expanding, public provision standards remained 
radically insufficient. Despite faint improvements in the living conditions of low income 
households in the region, ill-housing is endemic in metropolitan areas as well as in 
the countryside; inappropriate and insufficient sanitation and water supplies are the 
rule, affecting lives and the environment; and infant mortality rates remain higher than 
national income would predict, holding at an average of 21.7/1,000 for the region as a 
whole, with Bolivia reporting a much higher figure of 45.6/1,000 and Brazil, 23.6/1,000. 
Only Chile presents for the 2005-2010 period an average rate of 7/1,000 (Figure 1), 
close to the OECD average of 5.4/1,000. Looking at Figure 1, one observes that the 
early 2000s have seen not really a drop but rather a plateau. 
Likewise, maternal mortality rates stay very high across the region, as shown by Figure 
2, compared to countries like Russia and China that have 7.5 and 15.8 female deaths 
per 100,000 live births (OECD 2013), respectively. 
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Figure 1: Infant Mortality Rate (Number of Deaths of Infants under One Year Old 
      per 1,000 Live Births)
Source: Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE) 2013.
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Figure 2: Maternal Mortality Rate (Deaths of Women of Reproductive Age per  
      100,000 Live Births)
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Source: UNICEF (2013)
It is true that social spending rose sharply during the past decade, as reported by ECLAC 
(2012). In the 1980s, average social spending in Latin America accounted for 10.2% of 
regional GDP (Cominetti and Ruiz 1998). A number of countries, including Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela, were ranked among those 
with higher spending, with an average share of 15.7% of GDP. The average per capita 
social expenditure in that decade was as low as USD 177.8 (Cominetti and Ruiz 1998). 
In 2008-2009, in contrast, social spending accounted for 62.2% of all public spending, 
compared with 45% in 1990. As a consequence, per capita social spending went up 
from around USD 300 in 1990-91 to USD 800 in 2008. The trend looks definitely very 
positive. 
Nevertheless, this growth has been unbalanced, since, yet again, social insurance and 
welfare safety nets, that is, monetary benefits, are the modalities of public provision 
that have registered the greatest increase. In its Social Panorama 2012, ECLAC points 
out that cash transfers, either contributory or means-tested, “accounted for more 
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than half of the overall rise in public social spending” (2012: 32). Of the total 6.6% 
increase between 1990-91 and 2008-09, monetary transfers, either contributory or 
non-contributory, made up 3.5%. Conversely, public spending on health has barely 
varied in twenty years: an increase of only 1%. And a similar trend was perceived in the 
category of social spending on housing and other areas, with a 0.4% record. 
These figures bring out further evidence on how spending related to the provision 
of decommodified goods and services has been ignored in several Latin American 
countries since the late 1990s. Healthcare presents itself as a good example. In most 
countries, the rate of public spending on health stagnated or even dropped during the 
first half of the last decade. By the end of the second half, a reversal trend was witnessed 
in most countries plotted in Figure 3, except Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, whose 
rates remained unchanged. Whatever the case may be, the demand for healthcare 
and other fundamental services left unfulfilled by public provision is subsequently 
offset by private household spending, reinforcing the role and prominence of private 
providers and the commodification of basic rights. Data released by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) in its “World Health Report 2005” confirms that public provision of 
health in Latin America is largely lacking. While the 60 largest countries in the world, 
from all regions, spend on average USD 806 PPP (purchasing power parity) per capita 
with the provision of public health, Latin American countries register a lower record of 
USD 261 PPP, closer to the pattern of low middle income countries and low income 
countries, whose average amounts to USD 142 PPP.  
Moreover, this trend comes as a contradiction when one recognizes that conditionalities 
such as medical visits are imposed on safety net recipients with no effort made to 
provide a broadly available supply of public health care facilities. The failure of the 
state to ensure adequate provision when benefits are conditional on their use unveils 
a perverse dynamic where the full responsibility for the lack of better access to health 
care is thrown upon those supposed to be the recipients of the aid. They are then held 
responsible for underperforming social indicators. 
 Lavinas - Anti-Poverty Schemes Instead of Social Protection  | 30
Figure 3: Public Spending on Health as a Percentage of GDP, Selected Latin  
                American Countries
Note: After 2000, values have been calculated by dividing by current prices in the national currency. 
Data does not include extra-budgetary spending.
Source: Own calculations based on CEPAL (2012). 
It is worth recalling that almost all Latin American conditional cash transfer programs 
tackling poverty adopted a design modeled on the Millennium Development Goals: 
guaranteeing a minimum income provided that school attendance was observed, and 
having pregnant women, infants under 5, and children of school age visit community 
clinics regularly in order to improve infant and maternal mortality rates and prevent the 
so-called poverty diseases (diseases with higher incidence among the extreme poor). 
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To this end, we might examine in detail trends witnessed by two Latin American 
countries with large safety net programs implemented in the second half of the 2000s 
(Figure 4). One is Peru, with Juntos, a CCT created in 2005, and the other Guatemala, 
whose safety net program Mi Familia Progresa was launched in 2008. 
2.3.3. Peru – The Juntos Program
Juntos prioritized poor families living in rural areas hit by the civil war, in an effort 
to reduce violence in areas controlled by the guerrilla. One should note that among 
the eligibility criteria, the level of exposure to violence was number one, followed by 
more traditional ones, such as the severity of poverty and malnutrition (Perova and 
Vakis 2010). A monthly stipend of approximately USD 30 was granted to all beneficiary 
households regardless of family size. From 2005 to 2011, Juntos reached around 
475,000 households (around 6% of the population), representing one million children 
(SITC-Juntos), at a minimal cost of 0.2% of national GDP. An evaluation carried out in 
2010 by Perova and Vakis acknowledges that although the poverty gap was narrowed, 
the monetary benefit was too low to effectively reduce poverty. However, as recognized 
in similar assessments, beneficiary families could improve their food standards by 
having access to a better diet on a more regular basis. Conversely, with regard to 
access to health services, the deficit on the supply side was the main cause referred to 
explain low immunization take up rates for children as well as for pregnant women (half 
of the targeted population was not covered) after a five year period. Finally, no major 
impact was detected with regard to educational attainment, since enrollment rates and 
school attendance levels were the same for beneficiary and non-beneficiary children. 
2.3.4. Guatemala: Mi Familia Progresa/ Mi Bono Seguro
An analogous situation typifies the Guatemalan case. Mi Familia Progresa (MIFAPRO) 
was renamed in 2012 Mi Bono Seguro. It is nowadays shrinking after having covered 
up to 862,000 families and more than 1.6 million children under 15 years old back 
in early 2011, an estimated 35% of the total population. Mi Bono Seguro reaches 
now only 110,000 families. In addition to having achieved a large scale, the former 
MIFAPRO provided a monthly benefit of around USD 35,21 hence converging to the 
benefit provided by Juntos. Within Latin America, however, the sum of the household 
benefit may range from slightly over USD 200 per month in Argentina to less than 
ten dollars in Chile, Honduras or Jamaica. MIFAPRO represented in 2011 0.36% 
of GDP (UNDP Guatemala 2011). Like Juntos, Mi Bono Seguro did not report the 
21 Actually, two distinct benefits were combined in one single stipend, one as an incentive for improving 
school attendance and health monitoring and the other one to address food insecurity. 
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expected outcomes: neither has schooling attendance improved significantly nor has 
family health coverage, mostly due to shortages on the supply side. To put it another 
way, the state did not fulfill its duties in providing public services such as health and 
schooling but imposed on the beneficiary families the burden to prove themselves 
responsible and deserving of the monetary benefit by finding and using services – that 
were nonexistent or extremely scarce. 
Figure 4:  Social Spending on Health in Selected Latin American Countries   
       as a Percentage of GDP
Source: CEPAL (2012)
In contrast to findings referred above that make conditional cash transfers a 
demonstration effect worth adapting in different national contexts for poverty alleviation, 
one may conclude that of three main outcomes – a substantial drop in the intensity of 
extreme poverty, social spending on the rise as a percentage of national GDP, and 
social demands reformatting and consolidating the relationship between the state 
and the destitute – only the first has been soundly accomplished in the case of Peru 
and Guatemala. Figure 4 shows that contrary to what would be predictable given the 
burden of conditionalities on beneficiary families, the Peruvian and the Guatemalan 
governments deliberately did not concentrate efforts and budget resources in the 
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provision of public health care but rather focused on providing cash, a very effective 
way to grasp commodification in countries where indigenous communities have been 
denied basic rights and well-being.  While in Peru the line in terms of health spending 
over the decade is flat, it drops sharply in Guatemala just before the introduction of Mi 
Familia Progresa and never picks back up. 
The case of the Rarámuri people in Mexico – an indigenous community of 20,000 living 
in a remote area – is telling, though not unique. About 20% were facing starvation after 
being dropped from Oportunidades for failing to comply with their co-responsibilities 
(another label for conditionalities). Schools were several hours away by foot, hospitals 
more than a day. Thousands gave up trying to find non-existent services. And they 
were severely penalized because they were incapable of meeting the program’s 
requirements (Yanes 2013). 
Although paradigmatic, cash transfers directed at the poorest combine conflicting 
proposals. They present a residual profile and turn out to be dissociated from a policy of 
de facto income guarantee with anti-cyclical and redistributive effects – a constitutive, 
although far from exclusive, element of universal social protection systems. They 
have been introduced at the margin of social insurance schemes when existent, as a 
compensation for the consequences of the economic adjustment on the needy – not a 
right guaranteeing basic standards for all those who qualify, but a residual safety net to 
compensate for market failures and promote some poverty relief. 
No Latin American country actually transformed these schemes into rights to be 
claimed by and entitled to all those eligible for income deficit. Uruguay may be seen as 
an exception given that the National Social Emergency Plan implemented from 2005 
to 2007 was designed to reach all those included in the target population, but failed to 
do so. Assessing the program, Gabriel Burdín and Gioia Melo (2009) acknowledged 
that, as a matter of fact, one fifth of eligible households did not apply and therefore 
continued to live in poverty with no monetary aid. The magnitude of this non-take-up 
proved troubling. But this distortion should come as no surprise. Excluding potential 
recipients is not incidental, but rather predictable, since targeting seeks to shrink the 
demand for means-tested benefits, instead of attempting to reach the poorest among 
the poor and provide the right benefit to the right individual.  
Moreover:
(1) these programs are low cost, and never amount for more than 0.6% of GDP (the case 
of the Bolsa Família Program in Brazil), therefore their impact in poverty reduction 
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is inevitably of low magnitude – not to mention the Mexican case, where for over 
more than 15 years of new generations of conditional cash transfer programs, 
enthusiastically claimed as extremely successful, poverty dropped only by 2.2 
percentage points in the period 1992-2010 (Gallardo Goméz and Mendizábal 2012), 
based on estimates released by CONEVAL (Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la 
Política de Desarollo Social, México). Actually, from 2008 to 2010, the poverty rate 
rose from 44.5% to 46.2%, increasing the headcount to 52 million people in 2010, 
as compared to 48.8 million two years before;
 
(2) although these cash transfer programs show a small role in explaining “moderate” 
poverty reduction,  they have a significant impact in reducing extreme poverty; 
(3) the criteria that apply for identifying the target group rely on absolute poverty and 
indigence lines established at extremely low levels (USD 1 or 2 per day), which 
tend to hide the real magnitude and severity of destitution and reduce the number 
of potential beneficiaries;
(4) none of these programs displays a take-up rate of 100%, far from it, for they suffer 
from horizontal inefficiencies due to inadequate targeting and means-testing; 
(5) these programs escape normative rules that would automatically adjust poverty 
lines and income benefits for inflation on an annual basis, reducing the income gap; 
 
(6) several schemes are funded through general taxation (often indirect) and  of 
consumption,  which means that they are very likely to be regressive since 
improvements in consumption by beneficiary families contribute directly to their 
funding;
(7) all these welfare schemes are disconnected from a social mode of regulation, 
therefore separate from institutional structures that would contribute to enforce 
their provision for all those qualifying; 
(8) they tend to be time-limited;
(9) conditional cash transfers remain fragmented and insular. They can be reduced or 
even halted at any time for shifts in politics or in the economy.   
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In sum, different modalities of programs apply,22 with specific eligibility criteria 
or conditionalities, aimed at distinct target populations, with varying models of 
administration (see Appendix 1). Some schemes appear more effective than others in 
reducing extreme poverty and alleviating poverty as a whole, depending primarily on 
the amount of the stipend or benefit. Generally speaking, however, their contribution 
to poverty reduction – one should emphasize - is relatively modest, their major impact 
consisting of narrowing the income gap, thus reducing the intensity of poverty.
The issue of the real contribution of these compensatory schemes to curb poverty 
rates in Latin America has nourished a lively debate on their effectiveness. The initial 
overwhelming enthusiasm demonstrated by those who held cash transfers up as the 
main cause of poverty reduction has now been substantially attenuated thanks to new 
analysis that grasp how economic growth and job creation in developing countries 
accounted for the leading forces behind this broad phenomenon. Comparative cross-
country analysis (Inchauste et al. 2012; ECLAC 2012) corroborates the common 
wisdom that growth is the best ally to force poverty back, since the two are strongly 
and negatively correlated – China being the largest example. As a matter of fact, a 
recent World Bank report indicates a decline in both the poverty rate and the number 
of poor in all regions of the developing world due to job opportunities for the most poor 
and growing labor earnings. Labor income explains more than 40% of the decline in 
poverty (Inchauste et al. 2012). ECLAC  also recognizes that wage earnings are the 
largest contributor to poverty reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean, whose 
growth rate, though lower as compared to 2002, averaged 4.3% in 2011 (ECLAC 2012). 
According to ECLAC, as in previous years, the rise in wages for poor households was 
the main determining factor in the poverty reduction. Three-quarters of the decline in 
poverty was due to labor income, and transfers (public and private ones) and all other 
revenue played a smaller part in the reduction  ECLAC 2012: 15). 
It is noteworthy that the revalorization of the minimum wage in most Latin American 
countries was a fundamental tool to reduce poverty and labor market inequality and 
boost domestic consumption (Therborn 2011; Lavinas 2012b). Figure 5 shows that 
except for Mexico, minimum wages tend to display a real increase in the 2000s across 
the region. The regional average rise (in real terms) from 2000 to 2010 reached 40 per 
cent.  
22 Leisering (2009) distinguishes three types of social cash transfers in developing countries: (1) social 
pensions, targeted to the elderly poor; (2) social assistance safety nets, designed on the grounds of 
welfare schemes in advance economies, with no conditionalities; and (3) conditional cash transfer 
programs, featured as hybrid systems, coupling security and behavioral aims, most of the time 
imposing mandatory work. This modality prevails in Latin American countries. 
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Figure 5: Real Minimum Wage - Latin American Countries (Index number, 2000   
       = 100)
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Notes:
Colombia - Minimum wage deflated by CPI.
Ecuador - Minimum wage, including additional payments.
Peru - Minimum living remuneration, deflated by CPI of Lima metropolitan area.
Mexico - Minimum wage deflated by CPI of Mexico City. Since 1996, deflated by CPI.
Venezuela - National minimum wage for non-agricultural activities. Deflated by CPI of Caracas metro 
area.
After 1985, values deflated by CPI.
Source: ECLAC (2012)
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In any case cash transfers targeted to the poor became a global issue, although 
appearing in several contexts as “mere handouts” (Leisering 2009: 248). Despite their 
narrow contribution to poverty reduction, should they be considered as an innovation 
in the context of fragile and incomplete social protection systems like those prevailing 
in Latin America? The answer is not straightforward. 
Innovation should be taken as a factor that enables de-structuring and re-structuring a 
given dimension (market, institutions, value added chains, etc.). So the question that 
applies is to determine whether conditional cash transfers entail a source of radical 
change that would restructure and transform social protection systems. Should they 
be considered a sign of the emergence of a new innovative dynamic? Will they bring 
about institutional change? My argument is that at best we are witnessing small and 
incremental shifts, on the margins, unable to overhaul incomplete social protection 
systems as a whole, due to their design and weak institutional links. The novelty 
brought in by these schemes remains a stopgap rather than a step that could bolster 
a sustained reaction dynamic leading to the thorough transformation of social policy 
regimes, making them expand and become more integrated and reflexive, notably in 
countries where welfare capitalism is still rudimentary. This tendency has not arisen so 
far in Latin American latecomers to welfare capitalism. 
Although remaining a major ad hoc instrument in the hands of democratic governments 
to regulate extreme poverty unconstrained by legal and institutionalized principles of 
rights, these welfare programs, by their presence and relatively large scale, represent 
in most countries a paramount initiative that acknowledges poverty as a national 
challenge to be addressed through public policies. This is a remarkable shift in Latin 
America given that social policy has always played a marginal role in the region, in 
addition to having simply been ignored for centuries. This path of recognition must 
be celebrated especially for appearing to be so successful. In a sense, they obliged 
conservative forces to switch sides and back schemes that they had initially denounced 
as programs doomed to failure for feeding clientelism and political interests. A broad 
though relatively conservative consensus was forged around the idea that conditional 
cash transfers are worth implementing for being inexpensive, easy to manage and 
politically rewarding, and beyond this, they are a major trump card in solving market 
failures. Some argue that they have forged a “poverty reduction consensus”, based on 
conditionalities which stand as new portrayed “partnerships” (Gould 2005: 1). 
Leisering (2009) holds that conditional cash transfers help poverty relief be seen as a 
right, an argument that sounds unconvincing, given that, as we have demonstrated, 
all these schemes fail to be shaped as an unconditional right. One may recall that 
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back in the case of the Poor Laws, some recognition was also achieved with regard 
to temporary and conditional poverty alleviation. Was this enough and, above all, was 
it transformative? Certainly not. Cash transfers targeted to the poor are definitely not 
paving the road to true universalism in the continent or to a common status to be 
shared by all. Instead, it can be said to recycle old mechanisms of selectivity and 
residual welfare, in a process of individualization and broader self-responsibility of the 
poor, rather than promoting de-individualization to foster solidarity and social cohesion. 
3. Evidence from the Bolsa Família Program
3.1. Main Features of the Bolsa Família Program
Would the Brazilian success story of Bolsa Família radically differ from the picture 
portrayed by the other Latin American experiments? 
The Bolsa Família Program (Family Grant) was enacted by Law 10.836 in 2004, during 
the first term of President Lula da Silva. It aims to ensure a minimum monetary income 
for indigent families (monthly per capita family income less than R$ 70 or approximately 
USD 35) and poor families (monthly per capita family income from R$ 70 to R$ 140, 
which means approximately USD 35 to USD 70). Rather than a single benefit, flexible 
parameters were adopted, adjusting the final amount of the benefit to the families’ 
composition.
In 2012, benefits were as follows: a basic monthly benefit for indigent families of R$ 70 
(1 Reais = 0.50 USD, in December 2012). Other monetary benefits were supposed to 
be added to this basic amount, in the case of the presence of children or adolescents. 
Each child in the age 0 to 14 bracket (up to 5 per family) receives R$ 32 (USD 16); 
adolescents (up to 2) receive R$ 38 (USD 19); and pregnant and breastfeeding women 
receive R$ 32 (USD 16). The mean value of the Bolsa Família transfer in 2012 was 
USD 65 per family. The government´s definition of poverty is based on total income 
declared and not on disposable income, the latter being, in fact, much lower. In Brazil, 
the bulk of the tax burden comes from indirect taxes, on consumption, that have a 
perverse impact on the poorest.
As in other programs, in order to receive a monthly stipend, families are required to 
comply with certain health-related conditions (regular visits to health clinics, especially 
for breastfeeding women, children under five years, and pregnant women) and/or 
education (minimum 75% school attendance for children ages 6-17, to discourage 
school dropout). As in other Latin American countries, mothers are the government’s 
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agents in ensuring compliance. For this very reason, the law designates them as the 
nominal recipients of the stipend. 
By December 2012, Bolsa Família had reached 13.5 million families, around 45 million 
people and 23% of the total Brazilian population. It amounted to R$ 15 billion in 2012 
(around USD 7.5 billion) or 0.45% of GDP. The largest concentration of recipients is 
in the Northeast region (55%), which shows the highest poverty rate in the country. 
Figure 6 summarizes the data.
The initial base of Bolsa Família’s recipients are the beneficiaries of the so-called 
“Remaining Programs” (Food Stamps, Food Grant, School Grant, and Natural Gas 
Subsidy), launched by the Federal government in the mid-1990s.They reflected a 
highly scattered and scarcely effective compensatory policy. Under President Lula, 
they were gathered under the Bolsa Família Program for reasons of efficiency and 
uniformity. 
Though broad in scale, Bolsa Família was not really a novelty as a mechanism to 
alleviate poverty. It was preceded by the 1988 creation of the “Benefício de Prestação 
Continuada” (BPC) [Noncontributory Regular Pension] aimed at guaranteeing a 
solidarity income to all individuals 65 or older not entitled to any other social insurance 
benefit and to disabled individuals living in households with a per capita family income 
of up to one-fourth of the prevailing minimum wage. In addition, a poor family with 
an elderly member that receives the BPC can also benefit from Bolsa Família cash 
transfers. The BPC does not count to calculate the per capita family income to be 
eligible for Bolsa Familia. This was the first initiative within the new Brazilian Social 
Security system to address poverty alleviation as a right. The target population covered 
by the BPC reaches 3.5 million beneficiaries with a monthly benefit of one minimum 
wage. The total cost of this Program represents 0.6% of Brazil´s GDP. 
As underlined by Lavinas: 
Three features distinguish Bolsa Família from BPC: i) Bolsa Família is subject 
to conditionalities; ii) it is a targeted program, but the target population is not 
subject to restrictions in terms of age or other characteristics (such as disability); 
iii) the formula for calculating poverty and indigence is different as well as the 
value of the monthly benefit” (Lavinas 2012a: 36-37).
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Figure 6: The Bolsa Família Scheme: Large Scale Makes the Difference
Source: Ministry of Social Development (MSD), Brazil (2012). 
This brings us to the first controversial aspect of the Brazilian anti-poverty strategy: 
poverty status is determined by two distinct poverty measures, according to the 
profile of the recipients, and not to their level of destitution. While the BPC has 
been institutionalized as a component part of the current social security system, the 
Bolsa Família remains ad hoc. The monetary threshold that applies to each is also 
sharply different;23 Bolsa Familia’s threshold currently corresponds to 1/5 of the value 
of the BPC´s threshold. It goes without saying that the Bolsa Família scheme ends 
up  underestimating the poverty headcount by far and therefore denies eligibility to a 
significant number of those in need who happen to be neither old enough nor disabled. 
This introduces a bias by discriminating against the other categories of the poor who 
comprise the vast majority. 
Likewise, while the Bolsa Família average monthly stipend was set in 2013 at R$ 140 
per family (around USD 70) – and could not exceed a maximum of R$ 306 (USD 152) 
per month24 - the value of the BPC was automatically set at R$ 678 (USD 340), on 
23 The Bolsa Família poverty threshold was set at a monthly per capita family income of R$ 70 in 2012, 
whereas the BPC poverty line, as a ratio of the minimum wage (1/4), amounted to R$ 311. Brazil so 
far has not adopted an official poverty line to serve as a unique parameter to all policies aimed at 
combatting destitution. 
24 The maximum amount of a benefit would be paid to a family living in extreme poverty, with 5 children 
under 15 years old, 2 adolescents and one pregnant or breastfeeding woman. 
Centro-
Oeste
5,10%
Norte
10,40%
Nordeste
50,20%
Sudeste
25,30%
Sul
9,00%
Regional Distribution 
of Benefits
• 13.5 million households awarded
• 45 million individual recipients
• Average family benefit: R$ 130 / mo. 
(USD 65)
• Annual spending: R$ 15 billion (USD 
7.5 billion)
 Lavinas - Anti-Poverty Schemes Instead of Social Protection  | 42
January 2013, being pegged to the national minimum wage. In addition, while the BPC 
is adjusted for inflation every year, and has enjoyed an increase in real terms due to 
the modality adopted by the Brazilian government to raise the minimum wage25, the 
Bolsa Família stipend has been frozen since 200926 (as happens to be the case with 
other similar schemes in Latin America, no index applies to adjust this safety net for 
inflation). As the inflation rate accumulated since 2008 reached almost 25%, Bolsa 
Família’s poverty line is falling every year and its recipients are cherry-picked from 
among the very poorest. 
The good news is that Dilma´s government made a step forward relative to her 
predecessor and acknowledged that not all those eligible for Bolsa Família turned 
out to be recipients. According to the estimates released by the Ministry of Social 
Development, 800,000 families (around 2 million people) have not been reached, 
though deserving. Our own estimates, on the grounds of the PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional 
por Amostra de Domicílios, the National Household Sample Survey) from IBGE, raise 
this figure to 2.2 million families (or 7 million people). Two main factors help to account 
for this shortcoming. On the one hand, as put by Lavinas:
Targeting generally causes a non-negligible deficit in coverage, since the 
potential target population does not always display the relevant characteristics 
of poverty. Thus, targeting ends up reducing the demand, through the imposition 
of high inconvenience costs to access benefits (self-targeting). This amplifies 
horizontal inefficiencies (that is, part of the target population is covered, while 
part is not). Targeting also introduces vertical inefficiencies, allowing evasion 
(for instance, some families are included as poor without actually being poor)
(Lavinas 2012a: 39).
On the other hand, the fact that Bolsa Família is not a right but a welfare benefit subject 
to budget constraints diminishes its coverage and lowers the take up rate, occasioning 
horizontal inefficiencies, that is inequality amidst the most vulnerable and deprived. 
25 In the decade from January 2001 to May 2012, the minimum wage enjoyed a real increase of 93.7%. 
The Brazilian national minimum wage is indexed to changes in the Consumer Price Index (INPC) 
to adjust for inflation relative to the previous year, and then incorporates the economic growth rate 
reached two year before. 
26  The adjustment brought about was a move from a limit of three child benefits to five. 
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3.2. Is Bolsa Família Effective in Curbing Poverty? 
How effective is the Bolsa Família Program in reducing monetary poverty and extreme 
poverty compared to earnings and other fiscal transfers guaranteed through the 
Brazilian social security system (mostly social insurance benefits)? 
Tables 1(a) and 1(b) highlight the major factors that contributed to curb poverty and 
indigence in the 2000s. They are based on different sources of income (3 layers) 
obtained by those falling below the poverty and indigence lines set by Bolsa Família. 
Each bracket measures the net effect of each source of income in reducing both levels 
of destitution. This was made possible by a decomposition of per capita household 
income by income origin. The income breakdown refers to three layers: 1) earnings 
and wages (labeled “only earnings” in Tables 1a and 1b), which means income from 
paid work; 2) earnings plus monetary income from pension benefits and other social 
insurance benefits (labeled earnings + contributory transfers); 3) the third layer 
corresponds to all sources of income declared by poor households, this time including 
welfare benefits (labeled earnings + contributory transfers + welfare schemes, other27). 
Table 1 (a):  Brazil – Poverty and Indigence Rates (Estimates on the basis of the 
           Bolsa Família poverty lines)
Poverty 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Earnings + Contributory Transfers + 
Welfare Schemes and Other
35.8% 27.7% 20.3% 17.7% 15.5% 11.0%
Earnings + Contributory Transfers 37.1% 29.3% 23.4% 20.5% 18.8% 14.8%
Only earnings 47.9% 41.7% 35.2% 32.5% 30.6% 26.3%
Indigence       
Earnings + Contributory Transfers + 
Welfare Schemes and Other
15.9% 10.8% 6.7% 6.2% 5.4% 4.4%
Earnings + Contributory Transfers 17.3% 12.8% 9.7% 8.9% 8.3% 6.9%
Only earnings 28.3% 24.1% 19.7% 19.0% 18.3% 17.0%
Source: IBGE, various years.
27 “Other” also covers other sources of monetary income like cash received from relatives, etc. 
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Table 1 (b):  Brazil – Poverty and Indigence Headcounts (Estimates on the basis 
  of the Bolsa Família poverty lines)
Poverty 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Earnings + 
Contributory 
Transfers 
+ Welfare 
Schemes 
and Other
59,526,291 47,408,501 36,580,530 32,270,862 28,672,014 20,212,411
Earnings + 
Contributory 
Transfers
61,598,304 50,139,747 42,085,504 37,414,489 34,828,055 27,250,786
Only 
earnings
79,646,007 71,391,102 63,316,316 59,238,488 56,716,531 48,501,002
Indigence       
Earnings + 
Contributory 
Transfers 
+ Welfare 
Schemes 
and Other
26,481,009 18,486,432 12,051,795 11,303,082 9,915,183 8,043,978
Earnings + 
Contributory 
Transfers
28,810,218 21,980,776 17,409,897 16,276,404 15,320,303 12,701,661
Only 
earnings
47,024,294 41,284,142 35,532,253 34,588,116 33,919,999 31,287,361
Source: IBGE, various years
To facilitate the interpretation of these tables, I shall proceed by steps starting from the 
results relating to poverty reduction and, secondly, to the decline in extreme poverty.  
In 2001, the first year of the time series displayed in Tables 1a and 1b, 47.9% of the 
Brazilian population was living in poverty if only earnings income is taken into account. 
Paid jobs and work in general were not enough to lift almost half of the population out 
of poverty. This accounted for 79.6 million people. 
With the addition of social insurance transfers, the 2001 poverty rate fell from 47.9% 
to 37.1%, a 22% decline. Contrary to the widely held belief – “common knowledge” – 
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pension benefits in Brazil, predominantly public, are not regressive. Quite the opposite, 
given that they have taken 18 million people out of poverty!
In 2001, because the Brazilian welfare system was still fragmented and limited to the 
BPC, its impact in attenuating poverty proved marginal: welfare transfers helped only 
2 million people climb out of poverty, an increase of 2 per cent. 
All in all, in 2001 after all fiscal transfers, 35.8% of Brazilians remained in poverty, a 
total of 59 million people. 
The picture has significantly changed in 2011. The overwhelming shift is that within 
the earnings bracket, the poverty rate has dropped steadily and sharply, from 47.9% in 
2001 down to 26.3%  (a decrease of 45%) as a direct result of economic recovery and 
job creation. As shown in Tables 1a and 1b, throughout the decade, no other source 
of income appears to have had such a positive impact on poverty reduction. Thanks to 
the new dynamic of the labor market, currently integrating part of the most vulnerable 
groups, 31 million people were lifted out of poverty and the poverty headcount went 
down to 48.5 million. 
Another very interesting outcome arises from the greater effectiveness of pension 
benefits that enabled an additional 12 percent decline in the poverty rate in 2011 against 
a lower level back in 2001 (10%). Behind both trends is the recovery of the minimum 
wage, whose real value increased by 93.7% from January 2001 to May 2012. Figure 
7 helps illustrate this trend. From 2005 onwards, the recovery of the minimum wage 
sped up appreciably (refer to footnote 20). Thanks to public pensions whose basic rate 
is pegged to the minimum wage, 21 million more Brazilians escaped poverty in 2011. 
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Figure 7: Brazil – Minimum Wage (Constant Reais as of May 2012)
Source: IPEA (adjusted for inflation using the INPC).
Finally, welfare cash transfers also aided 7 million Brazilians to escape from  poverty 
and helped lower the poverty rate to 11%, a figure never seen in Brazil since the 
inauguration of its household database series back in the 1960s. In ten years, the 
poverty rate in Brazil dropped steadily, from 35.8% to 11%, an outstanding performance 
by all standards.
The same method of calculation and analysis applies to the indigence rate. Examining 
what happened with extreme poverty, one may find that the effects of economic growth 
on the labor market did not actually favor the indigent as noticeably as happened to be 
the case for the poor. This accounts for the extremely low levels of schooling, human 
capital, and precarious and low paid occupations held by the indigent, who are less 
likely to benefit from improvements derived from an upward trend in the economy. 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
R$
      desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series No. 51, 2013 | 47
Therefore it comes as no surprise that economic growth impacts the poor and the 
extreme poor in different ways and with varying intensity. 
The decline in the average indigence rate (all incomes included) over the decade 
tracked closely with the poverty rate: 2/3 of the most needy were lifted out of extreme 
poverty in 2011, which corresponds to 18 million Brazilians. Not bad at all! However, 
job opportunities cut extreme poverty by just 35%, against 45% in the case of poverty. 
Conversely, pension benefits were the major factor in shrinking indigence by more than 
half, yet again thanks to being linked to the minimum wage. They contributed to lifting 
19 million Brazilians out of extreme poverty.
Finally welfare benefits diminished the number of indigent from 12 million to 8 million in 
2011, showing a broader impact as compared to 2001, due to the extended coverage 
of safety nets over time. 
In sum, in 10 years, Brazil eliminated three-quarters of its extreme poverty! Nonetheless 
some figures remain troubling: at least 28 million Brazilians still fall below the poverty 
line (Figure 8), a measure that falls below the thresholds recommended even by the 
World Bank. 
Figure 8: Brazil – Trends in Extreme Poverty and Poverty
Source:IBGE, various years.
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3.3. Addressing Inequality
It is worth recalling that poverty and indigence thresholds in Brazil are problematically 
low and therefore the figures presented above are inevitably underestimated. If Brazil 
were to implement a relative poverty line along the lines of the one currently in use in 
the European Union – set as 50% of the median per capita income – the poverty rate 
in Brazil would soar to 40%28 (approximately 70 million people). Median per capita 
income in Brazil remains fairly low (notably in rural areas), as shown in Figure 9, and 
amounted to only R$ 466 in 2011 (around USD 233 per month). This means that 
40% of all Brazilians live on a per capita income lower than USD 120. These figures 
say a great deal about the choices of poverty measures in Brazil and in other Latin 
American countries, and raise concerns about the appropriateness of asserting that 
the emergence of a new and broad middle class29 is pushing out poverty! According to 
the federal government, the new middle class starts with an average per capita family 
income of R$ 292 per month, the equivalent of less than 10 Reais a day (or less than 
5 dollars a day).
In spite of being on the rise, per capita family income in Brazil, either median or 
average is globally low, which in a sense makes it difficult to address and change 
poverty measures and make them suitable to a high middle income country. This is due 
primarily to the abysmal levels of inequality still prevailing in the country.
Figure 9: Brazil – Per Capita Household Income, Median and Average
Source: IBGE, various years.
28  Estimates calculated by the author from PNAD data from IBGE. 
29  For more information about this debate, refer to http://www.politicasocial.net.br/ (Plataforma Política 
Social).
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One has to acknowledge, however, that inequality has also decreased in Brazil as of 
late. Figure 10 exhibits this positive trend although asserting that inequality persists at 
exceptionally high levels.30 The Gini index considering all sources of income dropped 
sharply from 0.593 in 2001 to 0.529 in 2011. With or without welfare benefits the 
tendency is sustainable. But the latter doubtless has an effect in attenuating inequality 
even more. The second bright spot is that the Gini index drops below 0.50 (to 0.482) if 
the wealthiest 1% is taken out of consideration. Figure 11 shows how the top 1% and 
the bottom 50% crossed paths in the 2000s. Whereas the income share of the top 1% 
of society declined from 14% to 11.6%, the income of the bottom 50% took on a slightly 
bigger share since 2005.  Yet again, even these magnitudes are outrageous and reflect 
both the severity of inequality in Brazil and all of the challenges ahead in curbing 
lingering income asymmetries. The bottom 20% in the income distribution does not 
enjoy a big slice of the cake: despite making headway, in 2011 they hold just 3.2% of 
all income against an even more meager 2.3% ten years before. 
Lastly, Figure 12 provides a full picture of the income distribution by quintiles in order 
to better grasp the upward trend enjoyed by Brazil at this moment in time. All quintiles 
improved their share in income distribution over time except the top 20%. However, the 
top quintile still holds more than 57% of all income. 
Figure 10: Brazil – Trends in Gini Index
Source: IBGE, various years
30 The data relate to declared income and not disposable income.
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Figure 11: Brazil – Income Share
Source: IBGE, various years
Figure 12: Brazil – Income Share by Quintiles
Source: IBGE, various years (including appropriations)
Nevertheless, and in line with other Latin American countries, growing labor earnings 
account for the bulk of poverty reduction and net improvements in income distribution. 
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Job opportunities were enhanced also to workers formerly occupied in non-monetary 
activities. Their share in the Brazilian workforce was halved, dropping from 9% to 6% 
in ten years. 
The process of market inclusion was consequently the result of job growth coupled with 
a spreading out of monetary cash transfers, both contributory and non-contributory, 
a phenomenon that increased average income and enhanced commodification to 
compensate for government failures to provide basic services.  For Brazil was not an 
exception during the 2000s and did not escape the tendency of concentrating social 
spending in cash transfers rather than in decommodified services such as public 
healthcare, education, sanitation, and other universal and unconditional provisions.   
Whereas federal social spending31 with welfare benefits registered a 280.3% real 
increase from 2001 to 2011, public health spending rose only by 18.3%, education 
by 66.6%, housing declined 92.2%, and sanitation fell by half over the same period of 
time. In 2001, social assistance spending corresponded to 22.4% of health spending 
and 45.5% of education spending. Relative to housing and sanitation, the ratio was 
14 times and 22 times greater, respectively. Ten years later (2011) the figures are as 
follows: spending with welfare benefits targeted to the poor now amounts to 72% of 
spending with health, is equivalent to spending with education, and is 754 times bigger 
than spending with housing and 167 times greater than sanitation. Brazilian social 
spending is increasingly concentrated on cash transfers and not in the provision of 
decommodified services and goods. 
Healthcare is by large a prime example of how a universal right has been damaged 
in Brazil by the rationale of finance-led capitalism. The 1988 Constitution instituted 
healthcare as a universal right in Brazil, whose provision should be ensured by the 
state. To this end, the Unified National Health System was created in 1990, strongly 
influenced by European universal health systems like the British and the French. In 
theory, the participation of the private sector should be complementary and heavily 
regulated by the National Health Agency. In practice, the privatization of the health 
system expanded in the absence of public resources (existent but diverted for other 
aims), which entailed a vicious cycle of underfinancing and ended up undermining 
universality (Ocké-Reis 2012; Bahia et al. 2013). This process continues and may 
definitively ruin a system once designed to be comprehensive and universal. In 2009, 
private spending on health reached 5.3% of Brazilian GDP while public expenditures 
amounted to only 3.5%. This adverse trend has worsened every year since SUS was 
31 Source: SIAFI – STN/CCONT/GEINC. Ministério da Fazenda. Fiscal Budget and Social Security 
Budget..
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founded. That same year, a bill passed in Congress authorizing families and individuals 
to fully deduct all health-related expenditures from their income taxes, particularly 
premiums paid to private health insurers.32 These deductions have no limits. In 2006, 
tax deductions related to health expenditures represented 30% of all public spending 
on healthcare. It is likely that it may correspond today to 40% (Santos 2013). The 
commodification of health in Brazil seems inexorable and reflects how the state has 
surrendered to financial markets.  
 It then comes as no surprise that social indicators with respect to living conditions in 
Brazil rank so low. According to IBGE (Figure 13), improvements in adequate sanitation 
or in the provision of clean water progressed very little in the last decade, whereas 
access to market goods such as cell phones, washing machines and computers soared 
stunningly: 86.4% of all Brazilian households report having at least one cell phone 
in 2011, against 31% in 2001. One out of two households now declares a washing 
machine, but only 2 in 3 enjoy adequate sanitation. With regard to the provision of 
clean water, no change was reported in 10 years countrywide. One should keep in 
mind that the numbers of households in Brazil amount to 62.3 million.  This means 
that no fewer than 30 million households, either poor or non-poor, do not enjoy healthy 
clean water! Nothing can justify such a low rate of clean water supply in a country like 
Brazil.
Figure 13: Brazil – Percentage of Households with Specific Facilities and Goods
Source: IBGE, various years.
32 In 1992, only expenditure for medicine was excluded. 
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Therefore, while the good news is that commodification spreads fast, the not-so-
good news is that de-commodification, a major and indisputable component of social 
protection systems, is at stake. Social infrastructure and access to decommodified 
goods and services delivered by the state do not progress at the same pace, 
aggravating inequality gaps whose measurement appears to be more difficult to gauge. 
Government failures in delivering basic services and goods in periods of economic 
growth, coupled with job creation and rising income foment private spending in realms 
that used to be public, such as education and health. As a consequence, privatization 
is boosted and universality is jeopardized, a drawback particularly for middle income 
countries, like Brazil, where social heterogeneity and inequality remain the foremost 
challenge ahead. Rather than enhancing and strengthening welfare capitalism, the 
new tendency of finance-led capitalism is to foster commodification through poverty 
alleviation programs. Yet again, Brazil is not an exception. 
For Bolsa Família recipients, access to consumption credit is eased through special 
consumption credit lines, whose average interest rates remain prohibitive33, ranging 
from 1.8% per month up to 4%.34 Nonetheless, it is the first time that those most 
deprived, at the bottom of the income distribution in Brazil, can borrow from public 
banks and buy consumer goods that were lacking. In parallel, the supply of banking 
products and services is broadening, in particular in the realms of private insurance for 
all kind of risks, apparently at low fees. This is considered a new social provision from 
the banking system! 
What actually boosted domestic demand in Brazil among the poor recently was most 
probably not cash transfers but the access to the financial market provided by the 
status of being a safety net recipient – a new ID for the poor, controlled by the state, 
retailers and banks - coupled with the lure of diverse and very “compelling” new financial 
products.   
33 There are special consumption credit lines that are mainly accessed by the beneficiaries of the 
Bolsa Família or the BPC.  This is the case of the credit line Crédito Fácil, from the Caixa Econômica 
Federal (commercial and savings public bank) as well as the Construcard, the latter directed towards 
purchasing housing materials, while the former provides loans to buy wage goods and durable 
goods, such as TV, washing machine, fridges. Banco do Nordeste do Brasil offers the Credito Amigo 
credit line for the same purposes. Usually big national retailers have online systems integrated with 
Caixa Econômica Federal, and loan requests can be approved almost immediately. Just to give an 
example, a new credit line, the Crédito Caixa Fácil, provides loans up to R$ 200 (around USD 100), 
with no additional collateral, and no special purpose, charging interest rates of 2% per month (the 
annual inflation rate for 2012 was estimated in 5%). Lenders would then have to pay R$4 per month 
as interest rate, which appears to be cheap for those whose granted with monthly stipends whose 
average value amounts to R$ 130 (USD 65).  In case of any emergency, like a health problem, the 
financial system will “secure” needs unmet by the state. 
34 Banerjee and Duflo (2011) state that “credit from informal sources tends to be expensive” but in 
Brazil interest rates charged by public banks are as high as those charged by the informal circuits in 
Asia.  
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Finally, the status of the poor has not been surmounted, but rather reaffirmed in 
this finance-led commodification process, through services and products tailored 
accordingly.  On the other hand, the social security budget is threatened by cuts in 
the payroll tax to reduce labor costs for entrepreneurs (despite the fact the country is 
not foreseeing a recession) and then foster competition. Sectors that most enjoy both 
types of incentives are those lagging behind in the global market for being neither 
innovative nor productive. They are accorded no penalties – not even from the market 
- but rather rewards. Penalties apply only to the destitute who fail to comply.
4. Conclusion: Conditional Cash Transfers and the    
 Transformation of Social Protection in Latin America
 The idea that a social reform enabled by the implementation of conditional cash 
transfers in Latin America could entail a permanent process of redistribution, reducing 
inequality and curbing poverty to marginal levels, does not hold. Moreover, cash 
benefits, though providing a safety net of last resort to the needy, do not suffice by 
themselves to foster convergence and social cohesion. Likewise, the way they have 
been designed and their weak institutionality as ad hoc programs reinforces the old 
model of a residual social service state, a paradigm overcome by the consolidation 
of comprehensive social protection systems in the second half of the 20th century. 
Because they are residual, and consequently cheap, these schemes are not effective 
in reducing poverty, although they can be shown to lessen the intensity of extreme 
poverty. Furthermore, despite recognition that destitution requires some compensatory 
mechanisms, now offered in monetary form, conditional cash transfers do not constitute 
rights, and poverty recognition does not automatically entail entitlements.  
Another question raised in this paper refers to what extent this bias in social spending, 
wildly imbalanced in its focus on monetary benefits rather than decommodified goods 
and services, may be threatening equality of capability.35 We have argued that anti-
poverty cash transfers are unlikely to address resource inequality (Therborn 2011) 
through market inclusion.  These cash transfers targeted to the poor constitute a 
powerful mechanism to expand market societies, but are very much likely to compound 
vulnerabilities and exacerbate the market rationale with no clear benefit for social 
protection systems as a whole. Social protection as a whole runs the risk of being 
downsized in the name of the poor, whose needs have been very modestly addressed 
through target income programs. 
35 This question came to mind after reading Göran Therborn’s arguments (2011), based on Amartya 
Sen’s approach, about what kind of inequality matters.  
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Thus far, the labor market and labor earnings have been the major factors that have 
fostered poverty reduction and curbed inequality in Latin America. Most social protection 
systems in the region remain incomplete and fragile, most probably are unable to 
sustainably and effectively address shortcomings in case of economic slowdown. 
Social policy remains predominantly pro-cyclical and despite its broader diversity 
has not yet been fully integrated as a synergic force to improve market regulation, 
guarantee economic stability, and prevent uncertainty.
The poor continue to be identified as poor, stigmatized through selectivity and controls, 
with the difference that they now receive monetary rewards in exchange for their 
participation as consumers in the market society in times of global financialization. 
Market provision, along with individualization, has been strengthened to the detriment 
of universal and public provision. In countries like Brazil, where universal policies and 
unconditional access to healthcare are granted constitutionally by the 1988 Bill of Rights, 
the patchy provision of public services reinforces the idea that privatizing is the only 
way. Whereas half of all Brazilians aged 16 or over believe that decommodified public 
services such as healthcare and education should be universal and unconditional, the 
same percentage oppose tax increases in order to better finance these services and 
adequately meet demand. As a full one-third of the adult population sees it, public 
services should be limited to the destitute, therefore narrowed in scope and quality. 
A large majority (75%) supports some redistribution towards the destitute, not as a 
right, but tied to conditionalities and controls, with non-compliance implying the loss of 
beneficiary status (Lavinas et al. 2012). 
 
In no Latin American country have safety net schemes to combat poverty led to a fiscal 
reform willing to ensure a permanent and wider redistribution pattern, on the grounds 
of shared common values, reinforcing social cohesion.  One might say that two societal 
paradigms are disputing hegemony in Latin America with regard to imposing a social 
protection framework. One considers that market inclusion mechanisms thought to 
enhance risk-taking opportunities are the way forward for rewarding those who prove 
responsible and rational, be the people in question poor, vulnerable, or neither. Cash 
transfers prevail in this framework, and decommodified well-being are to be restricted 
to a basic backbone. The other model values risk-sharing and prevention in order 
to protect and equalize access and opportunities irrespective of income levels and 
social status. In this model, the structure of social spending prizes not only income 
security but above all the promotion of equity and convergence, thus avoiding a dual 
and fragmented society.
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6. Appendix 1: Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in  
 Latin America
Country 
/ Year 
Started
Name(s) Target Conditions of 
Benefits
Benefit 
Amount 
(USD)
Annual 
Spending 
(USD)
various 
years
Population 
covered
Argentina
1997 
and
2009
Programa 
Nacional 
de Becas 
Estudiantiles
Asignación 
Universal por 
Hijo
Poor children 
13-19 
years old in 
schooling risk, 
living in poor 
families with 
household 
income lower 
than USD 
170 excluding 
other benefits 
School 
attendance
140/year 46 million 
(0.03% of 
GNP)
350,000 
pupils 
(0.9% of 
population)
Bolivia
2009
Bono materno 
infantil Juana 
Azurduy de 
Padilla 
Bono escolar 
Juacinto Pinto
Expectant 
mothers and 
children up to 
2 years old 
(Juana 
Azurduy)
Children 6-14 
years old, 
means-tested 
(Juacinto 
Pinto)
4 prenatal 
checkups; 
medical 
care during 
childbirth; 
12 postnatal 
checkups until 
child is two 
years old 
(Juana 
Azurduy)
School 
attendance
(Juacinto 
Pinto)
Total of 
258 in 17 
installments 
(Juana 
Azurduy, 
2010)
28.50/year 
for children 
in primary 
school and in 
first 2 grades 
of secondary 
school
(Juacinto 
Pinto, 2012)
226 million 
(Juana 
Azurduy, 
2009)
55 million 
(Juacinto 
Pinto, 
2009)
800,000 
people 
(5.8% of 
population)
(Juana 
Azurduy)
385,000 
children 
(35.6% of 
all children, 
2012)
(Juacinto 
Pinto)
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Country 
/ Year 
Started
Name(s) Target Conditions 
of Benefits
Benefit 
Amount 
(USD)
Annual 
Spending 
(USD)
various 
years
Population 
covered
Brazil 
2003
(Bolsa 
Escola 
1998 
with 1.5 
million 
families)
 Bolsa 
Família
 Poor 
families with 
monthly 
per-capita 
household 
income of 
less than 
USD 38.50, 
and poor 
families with 
per-capita 
monthly 
income of 
less than 
USD 77 with 
children 
under 17 
years old
 School 
attendance 
(80%); 
monitoring of 
vaccination 
and health 
center visits 
for children; 
expectant 
and nursing 
mothers
 Extremely 
poor 
families: 
37.30/month 
+ 12/month 
per child 
(up to 3 
children up 
to 15 years 
old) + 18/
month per 
adolescent 
child 16-17 
years old 
(up to 2 
 8 billion 
(0.4% of 
GNP) 
12.8 million 
families 
(23% of 
population)
Chile 
1981
Subsidio 
Unitário 
Familiar
Poor women 
with school-
age children, 
expectant 
women or 
women 
caring for 
disabled 
family 
members
School 
attendance 
and 
monitoring 
of health of 
children
6/month/
child
70 million 
(0.09% of 
GNP)
954,000 
pupils 
(6.3% of 
population)
Chile 
2002
Chile 
Solidario
People 
fulfilling 
criteria of 
means test 
by proxy
Participation 
in activities 
as 
determined 
by social 
workers
20/month 
(first half 
year)
15/month 
(second half 
year) 10/
month (third 
half year)
And 6/month 
(42 months)
22 million 
(0.02% of 
GNP)
290,000 
families 
(6% of 
population)
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Country 
/ Year 
Started
Name(s) Target Conditions 
of Benefits
Benefit 
Amount 
(USD)
Annual 
Spending 
(USD)
various 
years
Population 
covered
Colombia 
2001
Famílias en 
Acción
Poor families 
with children 
0-6 years 
old (bono 
nutrición) 
and children 
7-17 years 
old (bono 
educación)
Monitoring 
of health 
of children 
up to 6 
years old 
and school 
attendance 
for children 
between 
7-17 years 
old
6/month/
child in 
primary 
school
12/month/
child in 
secondary 
school 
20/month/
families 
with 
children up 
to 6 years 
old 
95 million 
(0.08% of 
GNP)
400,000 
families  
(3.6% of 
population)
Costa Rica 
2000
Programa 
Superémonos
Poor families 
with children 
6-18 years 
old (food 
stamps)
School 
attendance
30/month 
per child 
attending 
school
3.45 
million
(0.02% of 
GNP) 
12,234 
families 
(1.2% of 
population) 
Dominican 
Republic 
2005
Solidaridad Poor families 
with children 
up to 16 
years old
Monitoring 
of health of 
children up 
to 5 years 
old; school 
attendance 
for children 
between 
6-16 years 
old; parent 
training and
17/month 
(food) + 
9-14-19/
month 
Depending 
on size of 
family(1,2,3 
or 4+ 
children)
57 million 
(0.19% of 
GNP)
230,000 
families
(9% of 
population)
Ecuador 
2003
Bono de 
Desarrolo 
Humano
Poor families 
with children 
up to 16 
years old, or 
with elderly 
or disabled 
family 
members
Monitoring 
of health 
of children 
up to 5 
years old 
and school 
attendance 
for children 
6-16 years 
old
15/month/
child; 11.5/
month/
family with 
elderly or 
disable 
family 
members
200 million
(0.5% of 
GNP)
1.2 million 
families 
(40% of 
population)
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Country 
/ Year 
Started
Name(s) Target Conditions 
of Benefits
Benefit 
Amount 
(USD)
Annual 
Spending 
(USD)
various 
years
Population 
covered
Guatemala 
2008
Mi Família 
Progresa
Families 
in extreme 
poverty living 
in urban and 
rural areas
Monitoring 
of health 
expectant 
mothers 
and 
children 
under 6 
years old; 
school 
attendance 
for children 
6-15 years 
old
35/month
(health 
benefit + 
education 
benefit)
1.2 billion 
(0.32% of 
GDP)
862,000 
families
(35% of 
population)
Honduras 
2000
Programa 
de 
Asignación 
Familiar II
Vouchers for 
poor families 
with children 
between 6-12 
years old who 
have not yet 
completed 
4th grade 
in primary 
school; 
expectant 
mothers 
and women 
with children 
under 3.
Monitoring 
of health of 
expectant 
mothers 
and 
children 
under 3 
years old, 
and school 
attendance 
for children 
6-12 years 
old
5/month/
child (< 3 
years old); 
4/month/
family (up to 
3 vouchers) 
+ incentives 
for a range 
of services 
25 million
 (0.3% of 
GNP)
411,000 
families 
(28% of 
population
Jamaica 
2001
PATH Poor families 
with children 
up to 17 
years old; 
expectant 
and nursing 
mothers, 
elderly people 
over 65 years 
old; people in 
poverty who 
are disabled
Monitoring 
of health 
of children 
under 6 
years old; 
school 
attendance 
for children 
6-17 years 
old
9/month 16 million 
(0.16% of 
GNP)
220,000 
people 
(8% of 
population)
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Country 
/ Year 
Started
Name(s) Target Conditions 
of Benefits
Benefit Amount 
(USD)
Annual 
Spending 
(USD)
various 
years
Population 
covered
México 
1997
Progresa/ 
Oportunidades
Poor 
families 
with 
children 
up to 18 
years old; 
expectant 
mothers 
or women 
caring for 
disabled 
family 
members
Nutritional 
supplements 
for children 
under 5 
years old; 
school 
attendance 
and 
completion 
of secondary 
school for 
children 8-18 
years old, 
monitoring 
of health of 
all family 
members; 
health and 
nutrition 
information 
for women
Primary school: 
11-22/month /child 
+ 21/year /child for 
school supplies;
Secondary school: 
32-40/ month/child 
+ 26/year /child for 
school supplies);
Secondary school: 
53-69/month /
adolescent + 26/
year /adolescent 
for school supplies; 
300 transfer to a 
savings account if 
secondary school 
completed 16/
month for poor 
families 
70/month /elderly 
family member 
over 70 living 
with a poor family 
receiving benefits
3.3 billion 
(0.4% of 
GNP)
5 million 
families 
(23% of 
population)
Peru 
2005
Juntos Families 
in 
extreme 
poverty 
living 
in rural 
areas
33 /month 220 million
(0.2% of 
GDP)
487,000 
families 
(5.3% of 
population)
Note: Various years, calculations by author. 
Sources: Cobo (2010), Lavinas (2012), and Grosh et al. (2008: 493).
Additional sources for Bolivia: Chavez 2010, Cambio 2012, ILO 2013a, ILO 2013b, EABolivia 2013. 
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